## MPC180LMB Security Processor User's Manual

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**GLO** Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations

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### Chapter 1 Overview

This chapter gives an overview of the MPC180 security processor, including the key features, typical system architecture, and the MPC180 internal architecture.

### 1.1 Features

The MPC180 is a flexible and powerful addition to any networking system currently using Motorola's MPC8xx or MPC826x family of PowerQUICC<sup>TM</sup> communication processors. The MPC180 is designed to off-load computationally intensive security functions such as key generation and exchange, authentication, and bulk data encryption.

The MPC180 is optimized to process all of the algorithms associated with IPSec, IKE, WTLS/WAP and SSL/TLS. In addition, the MPC180 is the only security processor on the market capable of executing the elliptic curve cryptography that is especially important for secure wireless communications.

MPC180 features include the following:

- Public key execution unit (PKEU), which supports the following:
  - RSA and Diffie-Hellman
    - Programmable field size 80- to 2048-bits
    - 1024-bit signature time of 32ms
    - 10 IKE handshakes/second
  - Elliptic Curve operations in either F 2 m or F p
    - Programmable field size from 55- to 511-bits
    - 155-bit signature time of 11ms
    - 30 IKE handshakes/second
- Message authentication unit (MAU)
  - SHA-1 with 160-bit message digest
  - MD5 with 128-bit message digest
  - HMAC with either algorithm
- Data encryption standard execution units (DEUs)
  - DES and 3DES algorithm acceleration
    - Two key (K1, K2, K1) or Three key (K1, K2, K3)

#### **System Architecture**

- ECB and CBC modes for both DES and 3DES
- 15 Mbps 3DES-HMAC-SHA-1 (memory to memory)
- ARC four execution unit (AFEU)
  - Implements a stream cipher compatible with the RC4 algorithm
  - 40- to 128-bit programmable key
  - 20 Mbps ARC Four performance (memory)
- Random Number Generator (RNG)
  - Supplies up to 160 bit strings at up to 5 Mbps data rate
- Input Buffer (4kbits)
- Output Buffer (4kbits)
- Glueless interface to MPC8xx system or MPC826x local bus (50MHz and 66MHz operation)
- DMA hardware handshaking signals for use with the MPC826x
- 1.8v Vdd, 3.3v I/O
- 100pin LQFP package
- HIP4 0.25µm process

### 1.2 System Architecture

The MPC180 works well in most load/store, memory-mapped systems. An external processor may execute application code from its ROM and RAM, using RAM and optional non-volatile memory (such as EEPROM) for data storage. Figure 1-1 shows an example of the MPC180 in an MPC8xx system, and Figure 1-2 shows the MPC180 connected to the local bus of the MPC826x. In these examples, the MPC180 resides in the memory map of the processor; therefore, when an application requires cryptographic functions, it reads and writes to the appropriate memory location in the security processor.




Figure 1-1. Typical MPC8xx System Example




Figure 1-2. Typical MPC8260 System Example

### 1.3 Architectural Overview

The MPC180 has a slave interface to the MPC8xx system bus and MPC8260 local bus and maps into the host processor's memory space. Each encryption algorithm is mapped to a unique address space. To perform encryption operations, the host reads and writes to the MPC180 to setup the execution unit and, then, transfers data to the execution unit directly or through the external bus interface.

In FIFO mode, the MPC180 accepts data into the 4-Kbit input buffer and returns burst data through the output buffer. In this way, the host can automatically transfer bulk data through a given EU. This minimizes host management overhead and increases overall system throughput. Once the host configures the external bus interface (EBI), it receives an interrupt only after all data has been transferred or processed by the MPC180.




Figure 1-3. MPC180 Block Diagram

#### **Architectural Overview**

The interrupt controller organizes hardware interrupts coming from individual EUs into a single maskable interrupt, IRQ\_B, for the host processor. Multiple internal interrupt sources are logically ORed to create a single, non-prioritized interrupt for the host processor. The controller lets the host read the unmasked interrupt source status as well as the request status of masked interrupt sources, thereby indicating whether a given unmasked interrupt source will generate an interrupt request to the host processor.

### 1.3.1 Public Key Execution Unit (PKEU)

The PKEU is capable of performing many advanced mathematical functions to support RSA and Diffie-Hellman as well as ECC in both F 2 m (polynomial-basis) and F p. The accelerator supports all levels of functions to assist the host microprocessor in performing its desired cryptographic function. For example, at the highest level, the accelerator performs modular exponentiations to support RSA and point multiplies to support ECC. At lower levels, the PKEU can perform simple operations such as modular multiplies.

### 1.3.2 Data Encryption Standard Execution Unit (DEU)

The DEU is used for bulk data encryption. It can also execute the Triple-DES algorithm, which is based on DES. The host processor supplies data to the DEU as input, and this data is encrypted and made available for reading. The session key is input to the DEU prior to encryption. The DEU computes the data encryption standard algorithm (ANSI X3.92) for bulk data encryption and decryption.

DES is a block cipher that uses a 56-bit key to encrypt 64-bit blocks of data, one block at a time. DES is a symmetric algorithm; therefore, each of the two communicating parties share the same 56-bit key. DES processing begins after this shared session key is agreed upon. The message to be encrypted (typically plain text) is partitioned into *n* sets of 64-bit blocks. Each block is processed, in turn, by the DES engine, producing *n* sets of encrypted (ciphertext) blocks. Decryption is handled in the reverse manner. The ciphertext blocks are processed one at a time by a DES module in the recipient's system. The same key is used, and the DEU manages the key processing internally so that the plaintext blocks are recovered.

The DES/3DES execution unit supports the following modes:

- ECB (electronic code book)
- CBC (cipher block chaining)

In addition to these modes, the DEU can compute Triple-DES. Triple-DES is an extension to the DES algorithm in which every 64-bit input block is processed three times. There are several ways that Triple-DES can be computed. The DES accelerator on the MPC180 supports two key (K1, K2, K1) or three key (K1, K2, K3) Triple-DES.

THe MPC180 supports two of the modes of operation defined for Triple-DES (see draft ANSI Standard X9.52-1998):

• TECB (Triple DES analogue of ECB)

TCBC (Triple DES analogue of CBC)

### 1.3.3 Arc Four Execution Unit (AFEU)

The AFEU processes an algorithm that is compatible with the RC4 stream cipher from RSA Security, Inc. The RC4 algorithm is byte-oriented; therefore, a byte of plaintext is encrypted with a key to produce a byte of ciphertext. The key is variable length, and the AFEU supports 40-bit to 128-bit key lengths, providing a wide range of security levels. RC4 is a symmetric algorithm, so each of the two communicating parties share the same key.

AFEU processing begins after this shared session key is agreed upon. The plaintext message to be encrypted is logically partitioned into n sets of 8-bit blocks. In practice, the host processor groups 4 bytes at a time into 32-bit blocks and write that data to the AFEU. The AFEU internally processes each word one byte at a time. The AFEU engine processes each block in turn, byte by byte, producing n sets of encrypted (ciphertext) blocks. Decryption is handled in the reverse manner. The ciphertext blocks are processed one at a time by an AFEU in the recipient's system. The same key is used, and the AFEU manages the key processing internally so that the plaintext blocks are recovered.

The AFEU accepts data in 32-bit words per write cycle and produces 4 bytes of ciphertext for every 4 bytes of plaintext. Before any processing occurs, the key data is written to the AFEU, after which an initial permutation on the key happens internally. After the initial permutation is finished, processing on 32-bit words can begin.

### 1.3.4 Message Authentication Unit (MAU)

The MAU can perform SHA-1, MD5 and MD4, three of the most popular public message digest algorithms. At its simplest, the MAU receives 16 32-bit registers containing a message, and produces a hashed message of 128 bits for MD4/MD5 and 160 bits for SHA-1. The MAU also includes circuitry to automate the process of generating an HMAC (hashed message authentication code) as specified by RFC 2104. The HMAC can be built upon any of the hash functions supported by MAU.

### 1.3.5 Random Number Generator (RNG)

Because many cryptographic algorithms use random numbers as a source for generating a secret value, it is desirable to have a private RNG for use by the MPC180. The anonymity of each random number must be maintained, as well as the unpredictability of the next random number. The private RNG allows the system to develop random challenges or random secret keys. The secret key can thus remain hidden from even the high-level application code, providing an added measure of physical security. The RNG is also useful for digital signature generation.

The RNG is a digital integrated circuit capable of generating 32-bit random numbers. It is designed to comply with FIPS-140 standards for randomness and non-determinism. The RNG creates an unpredictable sequence of bits and assembles a string of those bits into a register. The random number in that register is accessible to the host through the host

interface of the RNG.

### 1.3.6 Software and Hardware Support

Customers will have access to device drivers integrated with the WindRiver VxWorks OS. Sample drivers will also be provided to customers wishing to integrate MPC180 support into other operating systems.

Third-party support for the MPC180 includes a development system for both the MPC860 and the MPC8260. The WindRiver/EST SBC8260C development system and Zephyr Engineering ZPC860C, both of which include a board support package, are available to accelerate customer design cycles.

## **Chapter 2 Signal Descriptions**

This chapter provides a pinout diagram and signal descriptions for the MPC180 security processor.

### 2.1 Signal Descriptions

Table 2-1 groups pins by functionality.

**Table 2-1. Pin Descriptions** 

Signal name	Pin locations	Signal type	Description
	I		Signal pins
A[18:29]	62, 64, 66, 67, 68, 70, 72–75, 77, 78	I	Address—address bus from the processor core. These bits are decoded in the MPC180 to produce the individual module select lines to the execution units. Note that the processor address bus might be 32 bits wide, while the MPC180 address bus is only 12 bits wide.  msb = bit 0  lsb = bit 31
D[0:31]	1, 2, 4, 6, 7, 9, 11, 12, 14, 16-18, 20, 22, 24, 28–32, 34, 36, 37, 38, 87, 89, 90, 92, 94, 96, 98, 99	I/O	Data—bidirectional data bus. This bus is connected directly to the processor core.  msb = bit 0  lsb = bit 31
CS	56	I	Chip Select. Active low signal that indicates when a data transfer is intended for the MPC180.
R/W	54	I	Read/Write. Read/write line 1 read cycle 0 write cycle
BURST	55	I	Burst Transaction. Active low signal used in the 8260 interface that indicates when the current read/write is a burst transfer.
TS	53	I	Transfer Start. Transfer start pin for control port. This signal is asserted by the 850/860 to indicate the start of a bus cycle that transfers data to or from the MPC180. This is used by the MPC180 along with $\overline{CS}$ , $R/\overline{W}$ , and A to begin a transfer.

**Table 2-1. Pin Descriptions (Continued)** 

Signal name	Pin locations	Signal type	Description
PSDVAL	82	I	Data valid. This active low signal is ignored when CONFIG=0 (MPC860 Mode), but is active in MPC8260 Mode. The assertion of PSDVAL indicates that a data beat is valid on the data bus.
TA / LUPMWAIT	61	0	Transfer Acknowledge. This active low signal is used in 860 mode and is asserted by the MPC180 when a successful read or write has occurred.  Local UPM wait. This active high signal is used in 8260 mode and is asserted to
			indicate the number of wait states for a transaction.
			Miscellaneous pins
RESET	52	I	Reset. Asynchronous reset signal for initializing the chip to a known state. It is highly recommended that this signal be connected to a dual hardware/software reset function. Thus, the system designer can reset the MPC180 chip with optimal flexibility.
CONFIG	57	I	Configuration. Input that indicates whether the interface is to an MPC860 or MPC8260
			1 8260 interface 0 860 interface
ENDIAN	40	I	Endian. Active high for big endian mode. Low for little endian mode.
			1 big endian 0 little endian
ĪRQ	85	0	Interrupt Request. Interrupt line that signifies that one or more execution units modules has asserted its $\overline{\mbox{IRQ}}$ hardware interrupt.
NC	26, 27, 49, 50, 51, 76, 100	_	No connection to the pin
		•	DMA Hardware Handshake pins
DREQ1	83	0	DMA Request 1. Active high signal which indicates that either the input or output buffer is requesting data transfer by the host or DMA controller. DREQ1 and DREQ2 are each programmable to refer to the MPC180 chip input buffer or output buffer. This signal is designed to interoperate with a PowerQUICC IDMA channel.
DREQ2	84	0	DMA request 2. Active high signal which indicates that either the input or output buffer is requesting data transfer by the host or DMA controller. DREQ1 and DREQ2 are each programmable to refer to the MPC180 Chip input buffer or output buffer. This signal is designed to interoperate with a PowerQUICC IDMA channel.
			Clock
CLK	59	I	Master clock input
			Test
TCK	47	I	JTAG test clock
TDI	48	I	JTAG test data input
TDO	44	I	JTAG test data output
TMS	46	I	JTAG test mode select
TRST	45	I	JTAG test reset

**Table 2-1. Pin Descriptions (Continued)** 

Signal name	Pin locations	Signal type	Description
			Power and Ground
IVDD	10, 21, 41, 60, 71, 93	I	+1.8 Volts (power pins for core logic)
OVDD	5, 15, 25, 35, 43, 65, 81, 88, 97	I	+3.3 Volts (Power pins for I/O pads)
ovss	3, 13, 23, 33, 42, 63, 79, 80, 86, 95	I	0 Volts (Ground)
IVSS	8, 19, 39, 58, 69, 91	I	0 Volts (Ground)

Figure 2-1 shows the MPC180 pinout.




Figure 2-1. MPC180 Pin Diagram

## **Chapter 3 External Bus Interface and Memory Map**

This chapter describes the MPC180 address map, the External Bus Interface (EBI), and EBI registers.

### 3.1 Execution Unit Registers

Each MPC180 execution unit has a dedicated set of registers. The MPC180 has a unified memory map that allows software addressibility to all internal registers. Figure 3-1 lists each MPC180 register and its 12-bit MPC180 chip address.

	PKEU		DEU		EBI
A00	BRAM [64x32]	200	Control	A00	Input buffer
A40	ARAM [64x32]	201	Status	A80	Output buffer
A80	NRAM[64x32]	202	Key1-right	B00	CSTAT
B00	EXP(k)	203	Key1-left	B01	ID register
B01	Control [CR]	204	Key2-right	B02	IMASK
B02	Status [SR]	205	Key2-left	B03	IBCTL
B03	Mask [MR]	206	Key3-right	B04	IBCNT
B04	Instruction [IR]	207	Key3-left	B05	OBCTL
B05	Prog. counter [PC]	208	IV-right	B06	OBCNT
B06	B06 Clear interrupt		IV-left		A ==11
B07	Modulus size	20A	DATAIN_R		AFEU
B08	EXP(k) size	20B	DATAIN_L	400	Control
B09	Device ID	20C	DATAOUT R	401	Status
		20D	DATAOUT L	402	Clear interrupt
	MDEU	20E	_	403	Key length
000	MDMB [0-15]	200	Configuration	404	Key data[0-3]
010	010 Digest [0-4]			408	Last sub msg
015	Control [CR]			409	Plaintext-in
016	016 Status [SR]		RNG	40A	Ciphertext-out
017	Clear interrupt	600	Command/status	40B	Context I/J
018	Device ID	602	AutoRand output	410	Context SBox[0-63]

Figure 3-1. MPC180 Execution Unit Registers

### **Address Map**

Most of these registers are read and write, however some have special permissions. See Table 3-1 for more information. The 12-bit MPC180 address of each register is shown next to the register name. All registers are assumed to be 32 bits wide; however, registers that contain fewer bits will return 0 (or a known value) on unused bits for that bus transaction only. Many registers contain multiple 32-bit words. If so, the number of words in the register set is shown in brackets after the name. Individual execution unit chapters describe how to use these registers, the bit assignments, and bit ordering.

### 3.2 Address Map

Table 3-1 lists the addresses for all registers in each execution unit. The 12-bit MPC180 address bus value is shown along with a 32-bit host processor address bus value.

Table 3-1. 32-Bit System Address Map

MPC180 12-Bit Address	Processor 32-Bit Address	Register	Туре	
MDEU: 0x000-0x1FF				
0x000	0x0000_0000	Message buffer(MB0)	W	
0x001	0x0000_0004	Message buffer(MB1)	W	
0x002	0x0000_0008	Message buffer(MB2)	W	
0x003	0x0000_000C	Message buffer(MB3)	W	
0x004	0x0000_0010	Message buffer(MB4)	W	
0x005	0x0000_0014	Message buffer(MB5)	W	
0x006	0x0000_0018	Message buffer(MB6)	W	
0x007	0x0000_001C	Message buffer(MB7)	W	
0x008	0x0000_0020	Message buffer(MB8)	W	
0x009	0x0000_0024	Message buffer(MB9)	W	
0x00A	0x0000_0028	Message buffer(MB10)	W	
0x00B	0x0000_002C	Message buffer(MB11)	W	
0x00C	0x0000_0030	Message buffer(MB12)	W	
0x00D	0x0000_0034	Message buffer(MB13)	W	
0x00E	0x0000_0038	Message buffer(MB14)	W	
0x00F	0x0000_003C	Message buffer(MB15)	W	
0x010	0x0000_0040	Message digest (MA)	R/W	
0x011	0x0000_0044	Message digest (MB)	R/W	
0x012	0x0000_0048	Message digest (MC)	R/W	
0x013	0x0000_004C	Message digest (MD)	R/W	
0x014	0x0000_0050	Message digest (ME)	R/W	
0x015	0x0000_0054	Control (MCR)	R/W	
0x016	0x0000_0058	Status (MSR)	R/W	
0x017	0x0000_005C	Clear interrupt (MCLRIRQ)	W	

Table 3-1. 32-Bit System Address Map (Continued)

MPC180 12-Bit Address	Processor 32-Bit Address	Register	Type
0x018	0x0000_0060	Version Identification (MID)	R
	DEU: 0x200-0x3Fi	=	
0x200	0x0000_0800	Control (DCR)	R/W
0x201	0x0000_0804	Status (DSR)	R
0x202	0x0000_0808	Key1_R	R/W
0x203	0x0000_080C	Key1_L	R/W
0x204	0x0000_0810	Key2_R	R/W
0x205	0x0000_0814	Key2_L	R/W
0x206	0x0000_0818	Key3_R	R/W
0x207	0x0000_081C	Key3_L	R/W
0x208	0x0000_0820	IV_R	R/W
0x209	0x0000_0824	IV_L	R/W
0x20A	0x0000_0828	DATAIN_R	R/W
0x20B	0x0000_082C	DATAIN_L	R/W
0x20C	0x0000_0830	DATAOUT_R	R
0x20D	0x0000_0834	DATAOUT_L	R
0X20E	0x0000_0838	Configuration (DCFG)	R/W
	AFEU: 0x400-0x5F	·F	
0x400	0x0000_1000	Control	W
0x401	0x0000_1004	Status	R
0x402	0x0000_1008	Clear interrupt	W
0x403	0x0000_100C	Key Length	W
0x404	0x0000_1010	Key Low	W
0x405	0x0000_1014	Key Lower-Middle	W
0x406	0x0000_1018	Key Upper-Middle	W
0x407	0x0000_101C	Key Upper	W
0x408	0x0000_1020	Message Byte Double Word	W
0x409	0x0000_1024	Plaintext-in	W
0x40A	0x0000_1028	Ciphertext-out	R
0x40B	0x0000_102C	S-box I/J	R/W
0x410	0x0000_1040	SBox [0]	R/W
0x414	0x0000_1050	SBox [1]	R/W
0x418	0x0000_1060	SBox [2]	R/W
0x50C	0x0000_1430	SBox [63]	R/W

**Table 3-1. 32-Bit System Address Map (Continued)** 

MPC180 12-Bit Address	Processor 32-Bit Address	Register	Туре
	RNG: 0x600-0x7Fl	F	
0x600	0x0000_1800	Status	R
0x602	0x0000_1808	Random output	R
	EBI: 0x800-0x9FF	:	
0x800	0x0000_2000	Input buffer[128]	R/W
0x880	0x0000_2200	Output buffer[128]	R/W
0x900	0x0000_2400	CSTAT	R/W
0x901	0x0000_2404	ID	R
0x902	0x0000_2408	IMASK	R/W
0x903	0x0000_240C	IBCTL	R/W
0x904	0x0000_2410	IBCNT	R/W
0x905	0x0000_2414	OBCTL	R/W
0x906	0x0000_2418	OBCNT	R/W
	PKEU: 0xA00-0xBF	F	
0xA00	0x0000_2800	BRAM	R/W
0xA40	0x0000_2900	ARAM	R/W
0xA80	0x0000_2A00	NRAM	R/W
0xB00	0x0000_2C00	EXP(k)	R/W
0xB01	0x0000_2C04	Control	R/W
0xB02	0x0000_2C08	Status	R
0xB03	0x0000_2C0C	Interrupt mask	R/W
0xB05	0x0000_2C14	Program counter	R/W
0xB06	0x0000_2C18	Clear interrupt (CLRIRQ)	W
0xB07	0x0000_2C1C	Modulus size	R/W
0xB08	0x0000_2C20	EXP(k) size	R/W
0xB09	0x0000_2C24	Device ID	R/W

### 3.3 External Bus Interface

The EBI handles the interface between the processor and MPC180's internal execution units. It has the following features:

- Memory-mapped data transfers to/from the host to the MPC180 in single, burst, or DMA modes
- 4-Kbit input and output buffers that allows the host to set up an operation and pass control of interrupts and data flow to the MPC180 until the operation completes

- Automatic buffer filling and emptying. DREQ1 and DREQ2 stay asserted as long as memory space or data is in the buffers, letting the host load data for the next operation before the current operation finishes
- Interrupt routing and masking, which lets the host individually detect interrupts
- Interrupt auto-unmask, which lets the controller unmask an interrupt to the host when an operation finishes

### 3.3.1 EBI Registers

Table 3-2 describes the controller's seven 32-bit, host-addressable registers that are used to program MPC180.

Name	R/W	Description	
CSTAT	R/W	Command/Status Register. Used to control global MPC180 functions and to monitor interrupts (see Section 3.3.1.1, "Command/Status Register (CSTAT)").	
ID	R	ID. Gives the fixed ID number unique to the MPC180 (see Section 3.3.1.2, "ID Register").	
IMASK	R/W	Interrupt Mask Register. Allows the masking of interrupts to the host (see Section 3.3.1.3, "IMASK Register").	
IBCTL	R/W	Input Buffer Control Register. Contains the starting address in the MPC180 where data from the input buffer is to be written. Contains the counter mask field (see Section 3.3.1.4, "Input Buffer Control (IBCTL) and Output Buffer Control (OBCTL) Registers").	
IBCNT	R/W	Input Buffer Count Register. Gives the total number of 32-bit words to be written to a specific execution unit for a given operation. This number is not limited to 128 (4 Kbits), but is the total number of words to be taken from the input buffer and written to the selected execution unit (see Section 3.3.1.5, "Input Buffer Count (IBCNT) and Output Buffer Count (OBCNT) Registers").	
OBCTL	R/W	Output Buffer Control Register. Contains the starting address in the MPC180's address map frow where data should be transferred to the output buffer. Also contains the counter mask field (see Section 3.3.1.4, "Input Buffer Control (IBCTL) and Output Buffer Control (OBCTL) Registers").	
OBCNT	R/W	Output Buffer Count Register. Contains the total number of 32-bit words a specific execution unit is to write to the output buffer for a given operation. This number is not limited to 128 (4 Kbits), but is the total number of words to be read from the selected (or enabled) execution unit (see Section 3.3.1.5, "Input Buffer Count (IBCNT) and Output Buffer Count (OBCNT) Registers").	

Table 3-2. EBI Registers

### 3.3.1.1 Command/Status Register (CSTAT)

CSTAT, shown in Figure 3-2, is used to control the chip software reset and auto-unmask function and to report interrupt status. The controller synchronizes the software reset function to the rising edge of MCLK, guaranteeing sufficient setup and hold times. Note that after the CSTAT register is read, bits 18-23 will be cleared, thus not allowing bitwise operations on these bits.




Figure 3-2. Command/Status Register (CSTAT)

Table 3-3 describes CSTAT fields.

**Table 3-3. CSTAT Field Descriptions** 

Bits	Name	Description		
0–5	_	Reserved, should be cleared.		
6	DR2C	DREQ2 Control Bit 0 = DREQ2 displays the state of the output FIFO 1 = DREQ2 displays the state of the input FIFO		
7	DR1C	DREQ1 Control Bit 0 = DREQ1 displays the state of the input FIFO 1 = DREQ1 displays the state of the output FIFO		
8–10	_	Reserved, should be cleared.		
11–15	Source interruexecution uniterrupt no 1 interrupt pe	5: t pending		
11	DEU	Data Encryption Standard Execution Unit External Bus Interface interrupts		
12	AFEU	Arc Four Execution Unit External Bus Interface interrupts		
13	MDEU	Message Digest Execution Unit External Bus Interface interrupts		
14	RNG	Random Number Generator External Bus Interface interrupts		
15	PKEU Public key Execution Unit External Bus Interface interrupts			
16	DR2A	DREQ2 Activation 0 = Inactive 1 = Active		
17	DR1A	DREQ1 Activation 0 = Inactive 1 = Active		
18–22	Raw interrupt execution uni For bits18–22 0 interrupt no 1 interrupt pe	t pending		

**Table 3-3. CSTAT Field Descriptions** 

Bits	Name	Description	
18	DEU	Data Encryption Standard Execution Unit interrupts	
19	AFEU	Arc Four Execution Unit interrupts	
20	MDEU	Message Digest Execution Unit interrupts	
21	RNG	Random Number Generator interrupts	
22	PKEU	Public key Execution Unit interrupts	
23	MPC180	MPC180 IRQ. This bit, when set, indicates an interrupt is pending in the MPC180.  0 interrupt not pending 1 interrupt pending	
24–27	Destination	Destination bits. Only one execution unit on MPC180 can be active at a time through FIFO accesses, so the host must program CSTAT to enable the appropriate execution unit. The host must guarantee that all data related to a specific operation has been processed before updating CSTAT, otherwise unpredictable results occur in MPC180 because the controller acts on one execution unit at a time.  1000 DEU 1001 AFEU 1010 MDEU 1011 RNG 1100 PKEU 0xxx no active module	
28–30	AUTO- UNMASK	Auto-unmask bit. Enables or disables the auto-unmask function. This function is used to unmask an interrupt from the currently active execution unit. It is to be used when a execution unit sends a series of intermediate interrupts the host does not want to see. For example, if the DEU is enabled and active, many interrupts may be generated for intermediate results. The host, however, may only be interested in the final interrupt that occurs when the DEU completes processing all of the data. To begin the operation, the homasks off the interrupts from the DEU and then writes to the auto-unmask bit. Then, when the DEU completes processing all the data, the controller unmasks the DEU interrupt an allows the final DEU interrupt (signaling the completion of processing) to be sent to the homask can then read CSTAT to determine that the DEU generated an interrupt and take appropriate action. for bits 28–30:  000 disabled 001 enabled	
31	RST	Software reset. Performs the same function as asserting RESET on MPC180. Setting this bit resets the MPC180 within two MCLK cycles; the controller clears this bit.  0 —  1 chip reset	

The complete MPC180 register map, including all execution units, is available to the host. Although the host can access control registers and input and output buffers while an instruction is executing, it cannot access the execution unit itself.

### 3.3.1.2 ID Register

Figure 3-3 shows the ID register. Note that the ID register contains a 32-bit value that identifies the version of MPC180. Its value at reset is  $0x0065\_1491$  and should be read with the ENDIAN mode set to big endian.




Figure 3-3. ID Register

Table 3-4 describes the ID fields.

**Table 3-4. ID Field Descriptions** 

Bits	Name	Description	
0–7	_	Reserved, should be cleared.	
8–10	MPC180	MPC180 version number.	
11–13	MDEU	Message Digest Execution Unit version number	
14–16	DEU	Data Encryption Standard Execution Unit version number	
17–19	AFEU	Arc Four Execution Unit version number	
20–22	RNG	Random Number Generator version number	
23–25	_	Reserved, should be cleared.	
26–28	EBI	Controller version number	
29–31	PKEU	Public key Execution Unit version number	

### 3.3.1.3 IMASK Register

The built-in interrupt controller (IRQ module) gathers all execution unit interrupt signals and presents one output ( $\overline{IRQ}$ ) to the host. It also lets the user selectively mask or disable interrupts from execution units by programming the IMASK register. In this way, interrupts can be controlled from a single source. Some execution-unit-specific configuration is required to ensure proper response to any interrupt. The user can read the appropriate address in CSTAT to get the interrupt status of all execution units at once.

The interrupt port consists of the  $\overline{IRQ}$  output, which is negated after the host responds to all pending interrupts from the execution units.

All interrupts from the execution units have the same priority. Figure 3-4 shows the bit assignments in the IRQ register for all the MPC180 execution units. All enable (mask) registers operate on the corresponding bits. An interrupt is masked when its corresponding IMASK bit is a 1.




Figure 3-4. IMASK Register

Table 3-5 describes the IMASK fields.

**Table 3-5. IMASK Field Descriptions** 

Bits	Name	Description	
0–26	_	Reserved, should be cleared.	
27	DEU	Data Encryption Standard Execution Unit global interrupt control 0 interrupt unmasked 1 interrupt masked	
28	AFEU	Arc Four Execution Unit global interrupt control 0 interrupt unmasked 1 interrupt masked	
29	MDEU	Message Digest Execution Unit global interrupt control 0 interrupt unmasked 1 interrupt masked	
30	RNG	Random Number Generator global interrupt control 0 interrupt unmasked 1 interrupt masked	
31	PKEU	Public key Execution Unit global interrupt control 0 interrupt unmasked 1 interrupt masked	

### 3.3.1.4 Input Buffer Control (IBCTL) and Output Buffer Control (OBCTL) Registers

The IBCTL register is used to control the input buffer starting address and address increment function.

The OBCTL register is used to control the output buffer starting address and address increment function.

Figure 3-5 shows both the IBCTL and the OBCTL registers.




Figure 3-5. Input Buffer Control (IBCTL) and Output Buffer Control (OBCTL)
Registers

Table 3-6 describes IBCTL fields.

**Table 3-6. IBCTL Field Descriptions** 

Bits	Name	Description	
0–7	_	Reserved, should be cleared.	
8–15	Count mask	Defines how the buffer controller presents addresses to execution units when data is taken from the input buffer. The count mask bits define the number of 32-bit words to be transferred into each execution unit as defined by the input block size upon which the specific algorithms operate.	
16–19	_	Reserved, should be cleared.	
		Starting address of the input buffer data destination. The starting address is the internal offset to which the first word of data from the input buffer is written for a given operation. All subsequent addresses are derived from this address.	

Table 3-7 describes OBCTL fields.

**Table 3-7. OBCTL Register Field Descriptions** 

Bits	Name	Description	
0–7	_	Reserved, should be cleared.	
8–15	Count mask	Defines how the buffer controller presents addresses to execution units when data is read from the active execution unit and written to the output buffer. The count mask bits define the number of 32-bit words to be transferred from each execution unit as defined by the output block size produced by the specific algorithms.	
16–19	_	Reserved, should be cleared.	
		Starting address of the output buffer data source. The starting address is the internal offset from which the first word of data to the output buffer is read for a given operation. All subsequent addresses are derived from this address.	

### 3.3.1.5 Input Buffer Count (IBCNT) and Output Buffer Count (OBCNT) Registers

IBCNT indicates the number of 32-bit words to be used for an operation. For example, if the PKEU is to operate on 512 bits (16 words), IBCNT should be set to 0x0000\_0010, corresponding to sixteen, 32-bit words to be taken from the input buffer and written to the PKEU.

When the input buffer counter reaches its terminus, IBCNT = 0, indicating that the number of words transferred to the active execution units matches the IBCNT value, data transfer stops automatically.

OBCNT contains the number of 32-bit words expected to be read for a particular operation. For example, if the DEU module is to operate on 512 bits, OBCNT should be set to 0x0000\_0010, corresponding to sixteen 32-bit words to be read from the DEU module and written to the output buffer.

Figure 3-6 shows the IBCNT and OBCNT registers.




Figure 3-6. Input Buffer Count (IBCNT) and Output Buffer Count (OBCNT)
Registers

### 3.4 EBI Controller Operation

The controller (EBI) is the interface between the host, the input and output FIFOs, and the individual execution units. It also contains control logic designed to help off load flow control from the host. The controller facilitates single access or burst reads and writes from the host, and it also manages the interrupts that execution units send to the host. The controller also controls  $\overline{DREQ1}$  and  $\overline{DREQ2}$ , which can be used to signal DMA transfers to and from the buffers.

The MPC180 EBI supports the MPC860 or MPC8260 processor interface, depending on the static state of the external pin CONFIG. When CONFIG is 0, the MPC180 interface is MPC860-compatible. When CONFIG is 1, the MPC180 interface is MPC8260-compatible. Burst access is only supported to/from the input and output FIFOs in MPC8260 mode. In MPC8260 mode, the MPC180 always assumes bursts to be eight 32-bit words.

### 3.4.1 Buffer Accesses (FIFO Mode)

The controller contains an input buffer and an output buffer of 4096 bits each. These buffers can be written to directly by the host or by using DMA. For direct access, the host simply

### **EBI Controller Operation**

writes or reads the address of the buffer.

 $\overline{DREQ1}$  and  $\overline{DREQ2}$  (input/output buffer ready) are programmable handshake signals used for buffer control. An external DMA controller can use this handshake to service the input or output buffer with data transfers as required. The EBI CSTAT register determines whether these signals reflect the state of the input buffer or output buffer. By default,  $\overline{DREQ1}$  refers to the state of the input buffer and  $\overline{DREQ2}$  refers to the state of the output buffer.

### NOTE:

 $\overline{DREQx}$  refers to either  $\overline{DREQ1}$  or  $\overline{DREQ2}$ . Either can be programmed to refer to the state of the input or output buffer.

In FIFO mode, the input buffer automatically fills and the output buffer automatically empties. In the input buffer, this is accomplished by assertion of  $\overline{DREQx}$  whenever at least eight 32-bit words (in MPC8260 mode) of space are available. Similarly, for the output buffer,  $\overline{DREQx}$  remains asserted as long as at least eight 32-bit words (MPC8260 mode) are in the output buffer to be read.

# Chapter 4 Data Encryption Standard Execution Unit

This chapter explains how to program the DEU (Data Encryption Standard Execution Unit) to encrypt or decrypt a message.

### 4.1 Operational Registers

All operational registers within the main control block are 32-bit addressable, however they may contain less than 32 bits. The keys, initialization vector, plaintext and ciphertext are all 64-bit, and each takes two registers. Each has a left (most significant word) and a right (least significant word) register. Table 4-1 lists DEU registers. These registers are described in more detail in the following sections.

Table 4-1. Data Encryption Standard Execution Unit (DEU) Registers

MPC180 12-Bit Address	Processor 32-Bit Address	Register	Туре
0x200	0x0000_0800	Control (DCR)	R/W
0x201	0x0000_0804	Status (DSR)	R
0x202	0x0000_0808	Key1_R	R/W
0x203	0x0000_080C	Key1_L	R/W
0x204	0x0000_0810	Key2_R	R/W
0x205	0x0000_0814	Key2_L	R/W
0x206	0x0000_0818	Key3_R	R/W
0x207	0x0000_081C	Key3_L	R/W
0x208	0x0000_0820	IV_R	R/W
0x209	0x0000_0824	IV_L	R/W
0x20A	0x0000_0828	DATAIN_R	R/W
0x20B	0x0000_082C	DATAIN_L	R/W
0x20C	0x0000_0830	DATAOUT_R	R
0x20D	0x0000_0834	DATAOUT_L	R
0X20E	0x0000_0838	Configuration (DCFG)	R/W

### 4.1.1 DEU Control Register (DCR)

The control register, shown in Figure 4-1, contains static bits that define the encryption mode of operation for the DEU. This is typically written along with the keys and initialization vector at the start of each new encryption process. All unused bits of DCR are read as 0 values.




Figure 4-1. DES Control Register (DCR)

Table 4-2 describes control register fields.

**Table 4-2. DCR Field Descriptions** 

Bits	Name	Description
0–28	_	Reserved, should be cleared.
29	MODE	Selects the DES mode of operation. Both Electronic Code Book (ECB) and Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) are supported.  0 = ECB 1 = CBC
30	XDES	Controls single DES or triple DES.  0 = Single DES  1 = Triple DES
31	E/D	Controls whether the input data will be encrypted or decrypted.  0 = decrypt  1 = encrypt

### 4.1.2 DEU Configuration Register (DCFG)

The configuration register contains two bits that are set only during hardware initialization. All unused bits of DCFG are read as 0 values.




Figure 4-2. DEU Configuration Register (DCFG)

Table 4-3 describes DCFG fields.

**Table 4-3. DCFG Field Descriptions** 

Bits	Name	Description
0–29	_	Reserved, should be cleared.
30	RST	The DES can be reset by asserting the RESET signal or by setting the Software Reset bit in the Control Register. The software and hardware resets are functionally equivalent. The software reset bit will clear itself one cycle after being set.  0 — 1 software reset
31	IMSK	Clearing the interrupt mask bit will allow interrupts on the $\overline{\mbox{RQ}}$ pin. It does not affect the IRQ bit in the status register. This bit is set (interrupts disabled) any time a hardware/software reset is performed. The user must clear this bit to enable hardware interrupts.  0 enable interrupts 1 disable interrupts

#### 4.1.3 DEU Status Register (DSR)

The status register contains bits that give information about the state of the DEU. There are two bits which state when more input can be written to the input data register and read from the output data register. To maximize throughput, data is buffered, and reading and writing can be overlapped. When the IRDY bit is one, new data can be written to the input (DATA\_IN) registers. It is possible to write three 64-bit blocks of data before any output data is read (and the IRDY signal goes low).

Figure 4-3 shows the DES status register.




Figure 4-3. DES Status Register (DSR)

Table 4-4 describes DSR fields.

Table 4-4. DSR Field Descriptions

Bits	Name	Description	
0–29	_	Reserved, should be cleared.	
30	IRDY	Input Ready. Input Buffer ready to accept more data.	
31	ORDY	Output Ready. Output Buffer has data to send.	

Upon completion of an encryption (or decryption), the ORDY signal will go high, indicating that the output is ready to be read from the DATA\_OUT registers. If interrupts are enabled, then  $\overline{IRQ}$  will be asserted. After the ORDY signal goes high, new data in the

#### **Operational Registers**

DATA\_IN registers will start processing. When completed, the resulting output will be held in a working register until the output ciphertext is read from the DATA\_OUT registers. Then the held data will be copied to the DATA\_OUT registers and the ORDY signal asserted again. The interrupt  $\overline{IRQ}$  signal will be active as long as ODRY is asserted.

#### 4.1.4 Key Registers

The DEU supports up to three independent 56-bit keys. Each key uses two 32-bit registers (56 bits of key plus 8 bits of parity). Note that key parity bits are ignored in processing.

For single DES, only one key is used (Key1\_L and Key1\_R); the other two are ignored. For Triple DES, all three keys are used. To simulate two-key Triple DES (in which the first and third keys are identical), Key1\_L and Key1\_R are also written to Key3\_L and Key3\_R. When using three-key triple DES, the three keys must be written in order (Key1, Key2, and then Key3), otherwise the first key may overwrite the third.

The key registers are read/write and must not be written while data is being encrypted/decrypted. Doing so will result in corrupted data.

#### 4.1.5 Initialization Vector

The DEU supports CBC mode, which requires a 64-bit initialization vector (IV). The IV uses two 32-bit registers (IV\_L and IV\_R). The IV should be written before the first block of data is encrypted. After each block of data is encrypted, the Initialization Vector register is updated to prepare for the next block of data. This register is readable so that the current encryption context (mode, keys, and IV) can be saved and restored.

The Initialization Vector registers must not be written while data is being encrypted or decrypted. Doing so will result in corrupted data.

#### **4.1.6 DATAIN**

Data to be encrypted or decrypted is written to the DATAIN registers. Data is first written to DATAIN-R and then to DATAIN-L. DEU processing begins automatically with the completion of the write to the DATAIN-L register.

#### **4.1.7 DATAOUT**

Processed data is stored in the DATAOUT registers. Data must be read from DATAOUT-R first. Reading data from DATAOUT-L indicates completion of the 64-bit block read, which allows the DEU to write the next 64 bits to DATAOUT-R and DATAOUT-L. If two 64-bit blocks have been written to the DATAIN registers while the DATAOUT registers haven't been read, the DEU will stall to prevent an overwrite. IF three 64-bit blocks are written to DATAIN before any are read from DATAOUT, the IRDY bit in the Status register will go low, indicating that any additional blocks written to DATAIN will cause a loss of data due to overwrite.

## Chapter 5 Arc Four Execution Unit

This chapter explains how to program the AFEU (Arc Four Execution Unit) to encrypt or decrypt a message.

## 5.1 Arc Four Execution Unit Registers

All operational registers within the main control block are 32-bit addressable. However, they may contain less than 32 bits.

Table 5-1 lists AFEU registers. These registers are described in more detail in the following sections.

Table 5-1. Arc Four Execution Unit (AFEU) Registers

MPC180 12-Bit Address	Processor 32-Bit Address	Register	Туре
0x400	0x0000_1000	Control	W
0x401	0x0000_1004	Status	R
0x402	0x0000_1008	Clear interrupt	W
0x403	0x0000_100C	Key Length	W
0x404	0x0000_1010	Key Low	W
0x405	0x0000_1014	Key Lower-Middle	W
0x406	0x0000_1018	Key Upper-Middle	W
0x407	0x0000_101C	Key Upper	W
0x408	0x0000_1020	Message Byte Double Word	W
0x409	0x0000_1024	Plaintext-in	W
0x40A	0x0000_1028	Ciphertext-out	R
0x40B	0x0000_102C	S-box I/J	R/W
0x410	0x0000_1040	SBox [0]	R/W
0x414	0x0000_1050	SBox [1]	R/W
0x418	0x0000_1060	SBox [2]	R/W
0x50C	0x0000_1430	SBox [63]	R/W

#### 5.1.1 Status Register

The AFEU Status Register, shown in Figure 5-1, contains seven bits of information. These bits describe the state of the AFEU circuit and are all active-high.




Figure 5-1. Arc Four Execution Unit Status Register

Table 5-2 describes the AFEU Status Register fields.

**Table 5-2. AFEU Status Register Field Descriptions** 

Bit	Name	Description	
0–24	_	Reserved, should be cleared.	
25	Input Buffer empty	Set when there is no data waiting in the AFEU Input Buffer. This can be used to monitor when the AFEU is ready to receive the next sub-message while it is processing the current sub-message. Writing to the Message register will clear this bit.	
26	Full message done	Set when the last sub-message has been processed. This bit will remain set until a new key is written. Reading from the Cipher register will clear this bit.	
27	Sub-message done	Set when the sub-message has been processed. Once the next sub-message is written, the AFEU will begin processing it and this bit will clear.	
28	Permute done	Set once the memory is permuted with the key. Once the first sub-message is written, the AFEU will begin processing the message and this bit will clear.	
29	Initialize done	Set once memory initialization is complete. Once the key data and length is written, the AFEU will begin permuting the memory and this bit will clear.	
30	IRQ	Asserted whenever an interrupt is pending (if interrupts are enabled). The following conditions will generate an interrupt:  Memory initialization done Memory permutation done Sub-Message processing done Full Message processing done The specific cause of the interrupt can be determined by reading the additional bits of the status register.  Hardware interrupts are disabled following a reset. The IRQ bit in the status register is not affected by masking hardware interrupts in the control register.	
31	Busy	Asserted whenever the AFEU core is not in an idle state. Memory initialization or permutation and message processing conditions will cause this bit to be set. The Busy bit will be set during context writes/reads.	

#### 5.1.2 Control Register

Figure 5-2 shows the AFEU Control Register.




Figure 5-2. Arc Four Execution Unit Control Register

Table 5-3 describes the AFEU Control Register fields.

**Table 5-3. AFEU Control Register Field Descriptions** 

Bit	Name	Description
0–29	_	Reserved, should be cleared.
30	RST	The AFEU can be reset by asserting the RESET signal or by setting the Software Reset bit in the Control Register. The software and hardware resets are functionally equivalent. The software reset bit will clear itself one cycle after being set.  0 — 1 software reset
31	IMSK	Clearing the interrupt mask bit will allow interrupts on the $\overline{\mbox{IRQ}}$ pin. It does not affect the IRQ bit in the status register. This bit is set (interrupts disabled) any time a hardware/software reset is performed. The user must clear this bit to enable hardware interrupts.  0 enable interrupts  1 disable interrupts

#### 5.1.3 Clear Interrupt Register

The Clear Interrupt Register is a write-only register. Writing to this register will clear the  $\overline{IRQ}$  signal and the IRQ bit in the status register. The actual data written to this register is ignored.

## 5.1.4 Key Length Register

The Key Length Register is a 4-bit write-only register that stores the number of bytes (minus one) in the key. Writing to this register will signal the AFEU to start permuting the memory with the key. Therefore, the key must be written before writing to this register.

#### 5.1.5 Key (Low/Lower-middle/Upper-middle/Upper) Register

Each register is 32-bits wide (write-only). Because the key size may be 1 to 16 bytes in length, the key data is stored in four individually addressable registers. The key low register holds the lowest significant four bytes of the key. The Key Lower-Middle Register holds the next lowest four bytes of the key. The Key Upper-Middle Register holds the next highest four bytes of the key. The Key Upper Register holds the most significant four bytes of the key.

#### NOTE:

If the key length is not divisible by four, the lower key data registers must be filled before writing to the upper key data registers.

#### 5.1.6 Message Byte Double-Word Register

The Message Byte Double-Word Register is a 3-bit write-only register and is used to hold the number of bytes (minus one) in the last/partial sub-message. A 1 in the MSB of this register indicates to the AFEU that this is the last sub-message. Figure 5-3 shows the Message Byte Double-Word Register. The default number of sub-message bytes is four.

	0	28	29	30	31
Field	_		Last <sup>1</sup> sub-message	# sub-m byte	nessage s - 1
Reset	0000_	0000_0000_0000	)		
R/W		W			
Addr		0x408			

Setting the Last Sub-message bit in this register will cause the AFEU to reset and start initializing once the full message is complete. The contents of the cipher register will hold the last processed sub-message.

Figure 5-3. Arc Four Execution Unit Message Byte Double-Word Register

#### 5.1.7 Message Register

The Message Register is a 32-bit write-only register that stores the sub-message to be processed. This can either be the plaintext to be encrypted or ciphertext to be decrypted. Writing data to this register signals the AFEU to start processing the data.

#### 5.1.8 Cipher Register

The Cipher Register is a 32-bit read-only register that stores the processed sub-message. This can either be the encrypted ciphertext or decrypted plaintext. Data in this register is valid when the sub- or full message done bit is set in the status register.

#### NOTE:

If the sub-message is less than 32-bits, the unused bits in the Cipher Register will be the same as the corresponding bits written to the Message Register.

#### 5.1.9 S-box I/J Register

The Sbox I/J Register is a 24-bit read/write register where the Sbox I/J pointers are stored. The contents of this register must be read prior to context switching and must be written back to the AFEU before resuming message processing of an interrupted message. This register may be accessed whenever the AFEU is idle.

#### 5.1.10 S-box0 – S-box63 Memory

The S-box Memory consists of 64 read/write 32-bit blocks. The entire contents of the S-box memory must be read prior to context switching and must be written back to the AFEU before resuming message processing of an interrupted message. The S-box memory may be accessed whenever the AFEU is idle.



Arc Four Execution Unit Registers			

# **Chapter 6 Message Digest Execution Unit**

This chapter explains how to program the MDEU (Message Digest Execution Unit) within the MPC180 to hash a message for authentication.

## 6.1 Operational Registers

All operational registers within the MDEU are 32-bit addressable, however they may contain less than 32 bits.

Table 6-1 lists message registers. These registers are described in more detail in the following sections.

Table 6-1. Message Digest Execution Unit (MDEU) Registers

MPC180 12-Bit Address	Processor 32-Bit Address	Register	Туре
0x000	0x0000_0000	Message buffer(MB0)	W
0x001	0x0000_0004	Message buffer(MB1)	W
0x002	0x0000_0008	Message buffer(MB2)	W
0x003	0x0000_000C	Message buffer(MB3)	W
0x004	0x0000_0010	Message buffer(MB4)	W
0x005	0x0000_0014	Message buffer(MB5)	W
0x006	0x0000_0018	Message buffer(MB6)	W
0x007	0x0000_001C	Message buffer(MB7)	W
0x008	0x0000_0020	Message buffer(MB8)	W
0x009	0x0000_0024	Message buffer(MB9)	W
0x00A	0x0000_0028	Message buffer(MB10)	W
0x00B	0x0000_002C	Message buffer(MB11)	W
0x00C	0x0000_0030	Message buffer(MB12)	W
0x00D	0x0000_0034	Message buffer(MB13)	W
0x00E	0x0000_0038	Message buffer(MB14)	W
0x00F	0x0000_003C	Message buffer(MB15)	W
0x010	0x0000_0040	Message digest (MA)	R/W
0x011	0x0000_0044	Message digest (MB)	R/W
0x012	0x0000_0048	Message digest (MC)	R/W

#### **Operational Registers**

MPC180 12-Bit Address	Processor 32-Bit Address	Register	Туре
0x013	0x0000_004C	Message digest (MD)	R/W
0x014	0x0000_0050	Message digest (ME)	R/W
0x015	0x0000_0054	Control (MCR)	R/W
0x016	0x0000_0058	Status (MSR)	R/W
0x017	0x0000_005C	Clear interrupt (MCLRIRQ)	W
0x018	0x0000_0060	Version Identification (MID)	R

#### 6.1.1 MDEU Version Identification Register (MID)

The Identification Register contains a value reserved for a particular version and configuration of the MDEU. As future hardware is developed to support different field types or different microcode, each version will be assigned a different identifier.

The value returned is ID = 0x0001.

#### 6.1.2 MDEU Control Register (MCR)

The control register contains static bits that define the mode of operation for the MDEU. In addition to the static control bits, several bits are dynamic. These dynamic bits are set by a write to the MCR initiated by the host processor and are reset automatically by the MDEU after one cycle or operation. All unused bits of the MCR are read as 0 values.

Figure 6-1 shows the MDEU Control Register and Table 6-2 describes this register's fields.




Figure 6-1. MDEU Control Register (MCR)

#### **Table 6-2. MCR Field Descriptions**

Bits	Name	Description	
0–19	_	Reserved, should be cleared.	
20	ENGO	Enables automatic start of hashing as soon as the MDMB buffers have all been written. It is not necessary to set the GO bit manually.	
21	OPAD	The assertion of OPAD causes:  1. The value written to the 512 bit Message Buffer to be exclusive-ORed with the outer hash pad value  2. Unlike IPAD, a procedural change occurs: upon starting the hash of the value written to the Message Buffer, the contents of the Message Digest Buffer is copied to the Message Buffer, and is padded appropriately.  By performing the copy from MDB to MB, the step of appending the inner hash result to the padded key is performed automatically. OPAD is autocleared upon completion of a hash of a single message block.	
22	IPAD	The assertion of IPAD causes the value written to the 512 bit Message Buffer to be exclusive-ORed with the inner hash pad value. This value is autocleared upon completion of a hash of a single message block. Note that because this control bit affects the value stored in the 512 bit message buffer, if block chaining is to be used, it should be set only while the secret key is written to the 512 bit Message Buffer, and should be cleared manually at the same time GO is asserted.	
23		Reserved, should be cleared.	
24	MD5	The assertion of the MD5 bit signifies that an MD5 hash will be computed. If both MD4 and MD5 are not asserted, a SHA-1 Hash will be computed.	
25	MD4	The assertion of the MD4 bit signifies that an MD4 hash will be computed. If both MD4 and MD5 are not asserted, a SHA-1 Hash will be computed.	
26	RST	The RST bit is a software reset signal. When activated, the MDEU will reset immediately, halting any ongoing hash. All registers and buffers revert to their initial state. Normally, asserting GO continues an existing hash function across multiple 512-bit message blocks. Should a fresh-hash be desired for a new message block, the RST bit should be asserted prior to loading the new message block into the Message Buffer.	
27	ΙΕ	The IE bit represents the Interrupt Enable flag. When set to 1, the $\overline{\text{IRQ}}$ signal is enabled, thus when an interrupt occurs, the $\overline{\text{IRQ}}$ signal will be activated. When the IE bit is set to 0, all interrupts are disabled, and the $\overline{\text{IRQ}}$ output pin will be held inactive, that is, 0. The IE bit acts as the global interrupt enable.	
28	GO	The GO bit initiates the processing of the 512 bit message currently stored in the Message Buffer. This hash will be a continuation of any existing hash of multiple message blocks. In order to begin a new hash, the RST bit described below should be asserted prior to loading the new 512 bit Message Block. The 512 bit Message Block is double-buffered; a new block of message may be written while a hash is under process. If a new block is so written, then hashing will continue with the new block without GO needing to be reasserted.	
29	BSWP	The BSWP bit causes byte-swapping of the Message Digest Buffer Registers (MDA-MDE) as they are read out of the MDEU.	
30	STEP	The STEP bit allows the MDEU to be stepped through on a single clock cycle basis. When active, that is 1, the MDEU computes one "round" of the currently selected hash.	
31	_	Reserved, should be cleared.	

#### 6.1.3 Status Register (MSR)

The status register contains bits that give information about the state of the MDEU. Upon completion of a hash, DONE is asserted in bit 0 of MSR, followed by an interrupt on  $\overline{IRQ}$  if interrupts are enabled. In addition, whenever the contents of the message buffer are copied for internal hash processing, BE is asserted. Assertion of BE will cause an interrupt only if interrupts are enabled and buffer-empty interrupt is enabled (MCR:BIE is asserted). Address Error (AE) is asserted by addressing MDEU but not specifying a valid address within MDEU.

The MSR is effectively a read-only register. Its contents cannot be modified by the host processor except to be reset, which occurs when the host processor performs a write to the MSR, regardless of the data value.

Figure 6-2 shows the MDEU status register and Table 6-3 describes this register's fields.




Figure 6-2. MDEU Status Register (MSR)

Table 6	6-3. MSR	Field I	Descri	ptions
---------	----------	---------	--------	--------

Bits	Name	Description
0–27	_	Reserved, should be cleared.
28	IRQ	interrupt not indicated     interrupt indicated
29	AE	address error not detected     address error detected
30	BE	message buffer not empty     message buffer empty
31	DONE	Nash not completed     hash completed

#### 6.1.4 Message Buffer (MB0—MB15)

The MDEU hashes a message contained in the 16-word Message Buffer. The message should be processed such that a single-character message would be written to MB0. MB15 should only be programmed if the message block uses at least 481 bits.

The Message Buffer is not cleared upon completion of a computation process. Therefore, when programming the final block of a multi-block message, all locations should be appropriately written using the padding required by the selected Message Digest algorithm.

The message is double-buffered; once hashing begins the MDEU does not depend on the value stored in the Message Buffer. Therefore, the next block of a multi-block message may be written as soon as MSR:BE is asserted.

If IPAD or OPAD are asserted while the Message Buffer is written, then the value stored will be the value applied to the data bus exclusive-ORed with the appropriate pad value. In addition, assertion of OPAD causes the contents of the Message Digest Buffer to be copied into the first four or five words of the Message Buffer, with all other words set appropriately for a two-block message.

#### 6.1.5 Message Digest Buffer (MA-ME)

When DONE and  $\overline{IRQ}$  are asserted, the current hash value for all message blocks processed since the last reset are available in Message Digest Buffer locations MA–ME. For MD4 and MD5, which produce a 128 bit hash, ME is to be ignored.



**Operational Registers** 

# **Chapter 7 Public Key Execution Unit**

This chapter explains how to program the PKEU (Public Key Execution Unit) to perform mathematical functions.

## 7.1 Operational Registers

All operational registers within the main control block are 32-bit addressable, however they may contain less than 32 bits.

Table 7-1 lists all PKEU registers. These registers are described in more detail in the following sections.

MPC180 12-Bit Address **Processor 32-Bit Address** Register **Type** 0xA000x0000\_2800 **BRAM** R/W 0xA40 **ARAM** R/W 0x0000\_2900 0xA80 0x0000\_2A00 NRAM R/W 0xB00 0x0000\_2C00 EXP(k) R/W 0xB01 0x0000\_2C04 Control R/W Status 0xB02 0x0000\_2C08 R Interrupt mask R/W 0xB03 0x0000\_2C0C 0x0000\_2C14 0xB05 Program counter R/W 0x0000 2C18 Clear interrupt (CLRIRQ) 0xB06 W 0xB07 0x0000\_2C1C Modulus size R/W 0x0000\_2C20 EXP(k) size R/W 0xB08 0xB09 0x0000\_2C24 Device ID R/W

**Table 7-1. PKEU Registers** 

#### 7.1.1 PKEU Version Identification Register (PKID)

The Identification Register contains a value reserved for a particular version and configuration of the PKEU. As future hardware is developed to support different field types or different microcode, each version will be assigned a different identifier.

The value returned is ID = 00021.

### 7.1.2 Control Register (PKCR)

The Control Register contains static bits that define the mode of operation for the PKEU. In addition to the static control bits, several bits are dynamic. These dynamic bits are set by a write to the PKCR initiated by the host processor, and are reset automatically by the PKEU after one cycle of operation. All unused bits of the PKCR are read as 0 values. Figure 7-1 shows the PKEU control register.




Figure 7-1. PKEU Control Register (PKCR)

Table 7-2 describes the PKEU control register fields.

#### **Table 7-2. PKCR Field Descriptions**

Bits	Name	Description	
0–1	regNsel	01 memory N block 1 select 10 memory N block 2 select 11 memory N block 3 select	The regAsel, regBsel, and regNsel fields set pointers referencing memory blocks in the A, B, and N memories, respectively. Each memory, particularly where ECC is concerned, can be thought of as constituting four sub-memories (e.g. A(0), A(1), A(2), and A(3)).
2–3	regBsel	01 memory B block 1 select 10 memory B block 2 select 11 memory B block 3 select	Each sub-memory contains 32 16-bit locations (or 512 bits). For ECC processing, these sub-memories are used to store the multitude of intermediate data and final field elements required during processing. These memory pointers are used to determine which memory block is to be referenced during arithmetic processing or moves from one location to another. All of this is transparent to the host and performed automatically by the PKEU for high-level functions. However, for low-level functions, such as field add or multiplies, the host may set these pointers to reference a particular memory block. This flexibility allows, for example, the following computation: A(3) * B(1) * R <sup>-1</sup> mod N(2).
4–5	regAsel	01 memory A block 0 select 10 memory A block 1 select 10 memory A block 2 select 11 memory A block 3 select	
6	_	Reserved, should be cleared.	
7	F <sub>2</sub> M	The $F_2M$ bit causes the PKEU to perform arithmetic in the polynomial-basis. This must be set when executing operations for ECC $F_2m$ . When clear, all processing is performed using integer arithmetic. This would be required for all RSA and ECC $F_p$ processing.  0 integer arithmetic (RSA or ECC $F_p$ ) 1 polynomial-basis arithmetic (ECC $F_2M$ )	
8	XYZ	The XYZ bit enables the PKEU point multiply operation to bypass certain processing used support systems that operate in affine coordinates. Specifically, when set, the PKEU simply provides the final results (i.e. the X, Y, and Z field elements) which are no longer in the Montgomery format. When XYZ is zero, the PKEU assists the host in achieving its desired affine coordinate results. This is accomplished by including $Z^2$ and $Z^3$ in addition to X, Y, and Z and leaving these results in the Montgomery residue system. It is the responsibility of the host to find the inverses of $Z^2$ and $Z^3$ and provide these back to the PKEU to compute the affine coordinates.  0 affine coordinates  1 projective coordinates	

**Table 7-2. PKCR Field Descriptions (Continued)** 

Bits	Name	Description
9	$R_pR_n$	For a description of $R_pR_n$ see Section 7.5.3, "RpRN mod P Calculation." 0 $R^2$ mod N enabled 1 $R_pR_n$ mod P enabled
10	RST	The RST bit is a software reset signal. When activated, the PKEU will reset immediately. All registers revert to their initial state, and the Program Counter (PC) will jump to 0. Instruction execution will halt, and any pending interrupt will be deactivated. All memories (A, B, and N) will indirectly be reset since this signal causes the "clear all" routine to be executed.  0 normal processing 1 reset the PKEU
11	IE	The IE bit represents the Interrupt Enable flag. When set to 1, the IRQ signal is enabled, thus when an interrupt occurs, the IRQ signal will be activated. When the IE bit is set to 0, all interrupts are disabled, and the IRQ output pin will be held inactive, i.e. 0. The IE bit acts as the global interrupt enable.  Note that this does not affect the SR[IRQ] bit. That bit is set regardless of IE.  0 interrupts disabled 1 interrupts enabled
12	GO	The GO bit initiates the execution of the routine pointed to by the Program Counter (PC). This is accomplished by fetching the instruction addressed by the PC and to keep executing instructions until a jump to location 0 is encountered which tells the PKEU to stop executing. It is important to realize that once the PKEU is "going", the host has limited access to the PKEU internal memory space. Specifically, reads and writes to the RAMs are ignored during this state and all other locations must be referenced with extreme caution. Under normal circumstances, only the Status Register and EXP(k) should be actively referenced during this mode.  O rest condition  1 execute instructions without stopping
13	ECC	The ECC bit signifies that one of the ECC-related routines will be executed. Conversely, by not setting this bit, the PKEU will be configured to correctly execute RSA-related routines.  0 RSA processing enabled 1 ECC processing enabled
14–15	_	Reserved, should be cleared.

#### 7.1.3 Status Register (PKSR)

The Status Register contains bits that give information about the state of the PKEU. If an error occurs during normal operation, a bit in the PKSR will be set to 1. After a GO is issued to the PKCR, the next jump to location 0 will cause a bit in the Status Register to be set, followed by an interrupt on IRQ if interrupts are enabled.

The PKSR is effectively a read-only register. Its contents cannot be directly modified by the host processor except to be reset, which occurs when the host processor performs a write to the PKSR, regardless of the data value. Note that the host may indirectly affect the contents of the PKSR, such as when GO is asserted.

Figure 7-2 shows the PKEU status register and Table 7-3 describes this register's fields.




Figure 7-2. PKEU Status Register (PKSR)

Table 7-3. PKSR Field Descriptions

Bits	Name	Description
0–10	_	Reserved, should be cleared.
11	E_RDY	The E_RDY (exponent or k ready) bit indicates that the execution unit is ready to accept the next 32-bit word of exponent data or point multiplier (k) data in the EXP(k) register. The host processor may poll the status register to determine if this data needs to be provided or rely on IRQ (if enabled) to signal when to look at the register to determine what data needs to be provided. A write to the EXP(k) register will clear this bit as well as the associated IRQ (as long as no other condition has also cause IRQ's assertion). Note that there is approximately a two cycle latency associated with the clearing of IRQ following a write to the EXP(k) register. Since the EXP(k) register is double-buffered, the host response time, while important, is not critical to meet maximum performance. At a minimum, the host will have 8 integer multiplies for RSA or 8 point doubles for ECC to provide new data before adversely impacting the run time. Refer to the run-time formulae (see Table 7-26) to determine the exact time available for the target operating frequency.  For those instances where the host does not need to know the status of E_RDY (i.e. lower-level routines), it is recommended that it mask this bit to prevent it from affecting the IRQ signal.
12	IRQ	The IRQ bit of the Status Register reflects the value of the IRQ output pin of the PKEU. However, it will be set regardless of CR[IE].
13	ОВ	The OB bit of the Status Register is set to 1 if a read or write operation is to an unknown or reserved address. The contents of the data bus on an out-of-bounds read is indeterminate.
14	Z	The ERR bit of the Status Register is set to 1 if a general error occurs in the PKEU. Any error not associated with one of the Status Register bits will cause the ERR bit to assert.
15	DONE	The DONE bit of the Status Register is set to 1 when a branch to location 0 occurs. All of the embedded routines cause the DONE bit to be asserted upon completion. Also, upon reset, the DONE bit is set. This signifies to the host that the PKEU is ready for normal operation following the reset. Until that time, the PKEU is busy with its boot procedure. This primarily entails running the "clear all" routine, clearing all embedded RAM.

#### 7.1.4 Interrupt Mask Register (PKMR)

The Interrupt Mask Register allows the host processor to individually disable certain interrupts. Normally, any change in the Status Register will cause a hardware interrupt on the IRQ pin, as long as the Interrupt Enable (IE) bit in the Control Register is set to 1. If a given bit of the PKMR is set to 1, the corresponding bit in the PKSR will no longer cause the interrupt.

The PKMR is a read-write register. Its contents may be read or written by the host processor.

All unused bits of the PKMR are read as 0 values. Since the PKMR is a 16-bit register, when the host processor reads the PKMR, its contents are copied onto D[15:0], and the upper half of D is driven with 0's.

Figure 7-3 shows the PKEU Interrupt Mask Register and Table 7-4 describes this register's fields.




Figure 7-3. PKEU Interrupt Mask Register (PKMR)

#### **Table 7-4. PKMR Field Descriptions**

Bits	Name	Description
15–5	_	Reserved, should be cleared.
4	E_RDY	The E_RDY (exponent or k ready) bit indicates that the execution unit is ready to accept the next 32-bit word of exponent data or point multiplier (k) data in the EXP(k) register. The host processor may poll the status register to determine if this data needs to be provided or rely on IRQ (if enabled) to signal when to look at the register to determine what data needs to be provided. A write to the EXP(k) register will clear this bit as well as the associated IRQ (as long as no other condition has also cause IRQ's assertion). Note that there is approximately a two cycle latency associated with the clearing of IRQ following a write to the EXP(k) register. Since the EXP(k) register is double-buffered, the host response time, while important, is not critical to meet maximum performance. At a minimum, the host will have 8 integer multiplies for RSA or 8 point doubles for ECC to provide new data before adversely impacting the run time. Refer to the run-time formulae (see Table 7-26) to determine the exact time available for the target operating frequency.  For those instances where the host does not need to know the status of E_RDY (i.e. lower-level routines), it is recommended that it mask this bit to prevent it from affecting the IRQ signal.
3	_	Reserved, should be cleared.
2	ОВ	The OB bit of the Status Register is set to 1 if a read or write operation is to an unknown or reserved address. The contents of the data bus on an out-of-bounds read is indeterminate.
1	_	Reserved, should be cleared.
0	DONE	The DONE bit of the status register is set to 1 when a branch to location 0 occurs. All of the embedded routines cause the DONE bit to be asserted upon completion. Also, upon reset, the DONE bit is set. This signifies to the host that the PKEU is ready for normal operation following the reset. Until that time, the PKEU is busy with its boot procedure. This primarily entails running the "clear all" routine, clearing all embedded RAM.

#### 7.1.5 EXP(k) Register

The EXP(k) register contains the exponent (EXP) during exponentiation routines or the point multiplier (k) during ECC point multiply routines. EXP(k)\_SIZE must be specified before writing to the EXP(k) register. Since EXP(k) is 32 bits in size, data must be written to it during exponentiations or point multiplies and never before. This data must be provided most significant word (msw) to least significant word (lsw). The host processor determines, via IRQ (if not masked) or  $\overline{\text{IRDY}}$  (if selected to send via a DREQ pin), that new data is required. When IRQ is asserted, the host processor will look at the status word to see what was set. If the E(k) RDY bit is set, the host processor knows it must provide the next byte of EXP(k). If IRQ is masked, then it must poll the status register to determine when to provide the next word of EXP(k). When the host writes to the EXP(k) register, the E(k) RDY bit of the status register is cleared. As with all status register bits, the writing to the status register location will clear all of its bits, including the E(k) RDY bit.

There is an associated latency between the writing of the EXP(k) register and the deassertion of E(k) RDY (and IRQ). For this reason, it is recommended that the host waits a minimum of three cycles before polling the status register following a write to EXP(k).

The EXP(k) register is internally double-buffered. As a result, the host response time, while important, is not critical to meet maximum performance. At a minimum, the host will have 32 integer multiplies for RSA or 32 point doubles for ECC to provide new data before adversely impacting the run time. Refer to the run-time formulae (see Table 7-26) to determine the exact time available for the target operating frequency.

The host will be required to provide the first byte of EXP(k) very shortly after initiating the routine (point multiply or exponentiation). Because of the double buffering, the second byte will be allowed to be written very shortly after the first written byte of EXP(k). For this reason, IRQ and E\_RDY is deasserted for only one cycle following the write of the first byte of EXP(k). Once the second byte of EXP(k) is written, then there is a larger amount of time before the subsequent IRQ and E\_RDY is asserted.

The maximum size for either the exponent or k is limited only by the EXP(k)\_SIZE register that is, 64 words or 2048 bits). In practice, the values are typically less than or equal to the key size (for RSA) or field size (ECC).

#### 7.1.6 Program Counter Register (PC)

The Program Counter is an 11-bit register that contains the address of the next instruction to be executed. This register is a read-write register. During normal routine execution, this register is preloaded with the software routine's entry address.

#### 7.1.7 Modsize Register

This register sets the maximum size of the modulus (or prime) for RSA and ECC  $F_p$  or the irreducible polynomial for ECC  $F_2$ m. The maximum size of these vectors is 128 digits (1 digit = 16 bits) for RSA and ECC  $F_p$  and 32 digits for ECC  $F_2$ m (Note that the value written to modsize is not checked for validity). Thus, modsize represents the number of 16-bit blocks in the modulus or irreducible. If the number of bits in the modulus or irreducible is not evenly divisible by 16, then those remaining bits above the evenly divisible number of bits constitutes an entire 16-bit block in so far as setting modsize is concerned. Modsize is specified as a value between 0 and 127, which indicates a block size of 1 to 128 digits. On power-up or clear, modsize is set to 0. This register must be written to before initiating an arithmetic function.

All functions have a minimum modsize greater than zero for the function to operate properly.

#### **7.1.8 EXP(k)\_SIZE**

EXP(k)\_SIZE sets the maximum size of the exponent or multiplier vector in terms of 32-bit words. The minimum size is one 32-bit word, and the maximum size is 64 32-bit words. EXP(k)\_SIZE will be specified as a value between 0 and 63, which indicates an exponent or multiplier size of 1 to 64 bytes. On power-up or clear, EXP(k)\_SIZE is 0.

#### 7.2 Memories

The PKEU uses four memory spaces (RAM) consisting of 128 16-bit words. Three of these memories, A, B, and N, are R/W accessible to the host during normal operation. The fourth memory, t (or tmp) is normally not accessible to the host accept when the PKEU is placed in test mode.

Each individual memory can be thought of as consisting of four, equally sized (32 16-bit words), separate sub-blocks (e.g. A(0), A(1), A(2), and A(3)). Depending on the function to be executed, it may be necessary to specify which sub-block is to be referenced for the operation. The host specifies the sub-block for each memory via the PKCR. Note that it is not possible for the host to specify the tmp memory sub-blocks.

Prior to any operation, A, B, and N must be loaded with appropriate data. Once the operation is complete, the expected results may then be read from these memories. During processing, the PKEU uses all available memory to hold intermediate results. Memories can not be written to during processing or boot.

Note that despite being implemented as a series of 16 bit half-words, conversion from 32 bit words to 16 bit half-words is handled by the host interface. The RAM can only be written or read using 32 bit words.

#### 7.3 ECC Routines

## 7.3.1 ECC F<sub>p</sub> Point Multiply

The PKEU performs the Elliptic Curve point multiply function which is the highest level of ECC abstraction supported by the device. It is the intention that the host processor use the PKEU in such a way as to support ECC schemes defined in IEEE P1363 (and other ECC standards) where the point multiply is the critical and most computationally intensive, but not final, step in many of these schemes. The point multiply is performed in a near fully-automated fashion; however, there is some interaction required by the host processor (described below).

Point multiplies in  $F_p$  are carried out by the PKEU by performing repeated point add and point double operations using projective coordinates. As a result, the host processor is responsible for providing the point P represented as the point (X, Y, Z). For systems that do not operate in the projective coordinate scheme (i.e. point P is represented as the point (x,y)), X is simply x, Y is y, and Z is 1. The complete set of I/O conditions is shown below.

#### NOTE:

The scalar 'k' is assumed to be positive. If k = 0, the results of the point multiply are (1, 1, 0). If k < 0, then  $k \leftarrow (-k)$  and  $Y \leftarrow -Y \pmod{P}$ .

#### NOTE:

The input 'Z' is assumed to be non-zero. If zero, then the results of the point multiply are (1, 1, 0).

Table 7-5. ECC F<sub>p</sub> Point Multiply

	F <sub>p</sub> Point Multiply
Computation	Q = $k^*P$ , where Q = $(X_3, Y_3, Z_3)$ , P = $(X_1, Y_1, Z_1)$
Entry name	multkPtoQ
Entry address	0x001(FpmultkPtoQ)
Pre-conditions	A0 = $x_1$ (non-projective coordinate when XYZ=0) or $X_1$ (projective coordinate when XYZ=1) A1 = $y_1$ (non-projective coordinate when XYZ=0) or $Y_1$ (projective coordinate when XYZ=1) A2 = ( $z_1$ =1) (non-proj. coordinate when XYZ=0) or $Z_1$ (projective coordinate when XYZ=1) A3 = a elliptic curve parameter B0 = b elliptic curve parameter B1 = $R^2$ mod N value N0 = prime p (modulus) of the ECC system
Run-time conditions	EXP(k) = ms 32-bits of k (provided in 32 bit words throughout the point multiply, msb to lsb); first word provides following routine invocation per ERDY assertion.

Table 7-5. ECC F<sub>p</sub> Point Multiply (Continued)

	F <sub>p</sub> Point Multiply
Post-conditions	$\begin{array}{l} B1=X_2/X'_2\\ B2=Y_2/Y'_2\\ B3=Z_2/Z'_2\\ A2=\text{undefined (when XYZ=1) or }Z_2^2\text{ (when XYZ=0)}\\ A3=\text{undefined (when XYZ=1) or }Z_2^3\text{ (when XYZ=0)}\\ Unless explicitly noted, all other registers are not guaranteed to be any particular value.} \end{array}$
Special conditions	

Initial Condition		Final Condition
1 1	B3	Z <sub>2</sub> (or Z' <sub>2</sub> )
	B2	Y <sub>2</sub> (or Y' <sub>2</sub> )
R <sup>2</sup> mod N	B1	X <sub>2</sub> (or X' <sub>2</sub> )
ь	B0	?
a	A3	? (or Z <sub>2</sub> <sup>3</sup> )
1 (or Z <sub>1</sub> )	A2	? (or Z <sub>2</sub> <sup>2</sup> )
y <sub>1</sub> (or Y <sub>1</sub> )	A1	?
$x_1$ (or $X_1$ )	A0	?
	N3	?
	N2	?
	N1	?
prime p	N0	prime p
'1' - ECC	C enabled ECC	same
k (run-t	ime) EXP(k)	
sele	ct '1' or '0' XYZ	same
'0' - F	p enabled F2M	same
	set Modsize	same
	set EXP(k)_SIZE	same
	<del> </del>	

Figure 7-4. ECC F<sub>p</sub> Point Multiply Register Usage

It is important to note that unlike the RSA exponentiation routine, the point to be multiplied is not expected to be in the Montgomery residue system when loaded into the PKEU. All of the other ECC parameters are also expected to be loaded in standard format. This includes the a and b parameters of the ECC system. In addition, the "R<sup>2</sup> mod N" term is also required. This term is used by the PKEU to put the operands in the Montgomery residue system. See the full description of this function/value below.

It is the responsibility of the host processor to provide multiplier data to the PKEU during the operation. That is, the 'k' from the point multiplication 'kP' must be provided dynamically by the host micro-processor in 32-bit words. Note that the host must supply the k data starting with the most significant 32-bit word and working down to the least significant word. Each individual word, however, is formatted msb to lsb (i.e. "k\_word[msb:lsb]").

#### **ECC Routines**

PKEU asserts the IRQ signal when it is ready to accept more data. This tells the host processor to read PKSR to see what was set. If the E\_RDY bit is set, the host processor knows it must provide the next word of k - this data is written into the EXP(k) register one 8-bit word at a time. If this interrupt bit is masked, then it must poll the status register to determine when to provide the next word of k. The host should not look for the assertion of E\_RDY until after the routine (i.e. PKCR[GO] bit). Any data written to EXP(K) prior to this will be ignored.

Pin IRDY\_B also is used to signify when PKEU is ready for the next 32 bit word of EXP(k). IRDY\_B is active (low) whenever E\_RDY bit in the status register is active (high).

The point multiplication is optimized to efficiently produce results for systems that work in the projective coordinate scheme but can accelerate affine schemes as well. The host processor selects the scheme via the PKCR XYZ bit.

For affine coordinate systems (CR [XYZ]= 0):

The results of the calculation are returned to the A and B storage registers. Note that these values correspond to the projective coordinate values  $X, Y, Z, Z^2$ , and  $Z^3$ . X, Y,and Z are in the Montgomery residue system. In order to put the projective coordinates into their affine form, the following equations which define their relationships must be calculated:

$$x = X/Z^2;$$
$$y = Y/Z^3;$$

Because the PKEU does not support the inverse function, it is the responsibility of the host processor to find  $(Z^2)^{-1}$  and  $(Z^3)^{-1}$  by using any number of available modulo-n inversion techniques. Once this is accomplished, the host may then provide these values back to the PKEU to perform the final two *field* (modular) multiplications to find x and y. It is advisable that the user perform these multiplications in the PKEU to remove the values from the Montgomery residue system.

For projective coordinate systems (Control Register Bit XYZ = 1):

The results of the calculation are returned to the B memory. Note that these values correspond to the projective coordinate values X, Y, and Z and are *no longer* in the Montgomery residue system. The host may take these results as the complete point multiply (including the exit from the Montgomery residue system) (e.g.  $(XR)(Z^2)^{-1}R^{-1} \mod N = X$ ).

The following restrictions apply to the point multiply:

- The value of the k vector must be greater than one for this function to work properly.
- The point multiply operates with a minimum of five digits (Modsize = 4).

## 7.3.2 ECC F<sub>p</sub> Point Add

This function is extensively utilized by the point multiply routine. However, its value as a stand-alone routine to the host processor is extremely limited. As a result, the information provided on the routine is primarily for testing and debug purposes.

Table 7-6. ECC  $F_p$  Point Add

	F <sub>p</sub> Point Add
Computation	$R = P + Q$ , where $R \equiv (X_3, Y_3, Z_3)$ , $P \equiv (X_1, Y_1, Z_1)$ , and $Q \equiv (X_2, Y_2, Z_2)$
Entry name	FpaddPtoQ
Entry address	0x002(FpaddPtoQ)
Pre-conditions	A0 = X' <sub>1</sub> (projective coordinate in Montgomery residue system) A1 = Y' <sub>1</sub> (projective coordinate in Montgomery residue system) A2 = Z' <sub>1</sub> (projective coordinate in Montgomery residue system) A3 = a' (elliptic curve parameter in Montgomery residue system) B0 = b' (elliptic curve parameter in Montgomery residue system) B1 = X' <sub>2</sub> (projective coordinate in Montgomery residue system) B2 = Y' <sub>2</sub> (projective coordinate in Montgomery residue system) B3 = Z' <sub>2</sub> (projective coordinate in Montgomery residue system) N0 = prime p (modulus) of the ECC system
Post-conditions	$A0 = X'_1$ $A1 = Y'_1$ $A2 = Z'_1$ $A3 = a'$ $B0 = b'$ $B1 = X'_3$ $B2 = Y'_3$ $B3 = Z'_3$ Unless explicitly noted, all other registers are <i>not guaranteed</i> to be any particular value.
Special conditions	All variables followed with the tick mark (') indicate it is in the Montgomery residue system.




Figure 7-5. ECC F<sub>p</sub> Point Add Register Usage

## 7.3.3 ECC F<sub>p</sub> Point Double

This function is extensively utilized by the point multiply routine. However, its value as a stand-alone routine to the host processor is extremely limited. As a result, the information provided on the routine is primarily for testing and debug purposes.

Table 7-7. ECC F<sub>p</sub> Point Double

	F <sub>p</sub> Point Double
Computation	$R = Q + Q = 2 * Q$ , where $R \equiv (X_3, Y_3, Z_3)$ , and $Q \equiv (X_3, Y_3, Z_3)$
Entry name	FpdoubleQ
Entry address	0x003(FpdoubleQ)
Pre-conditions	B1 = X' <sub>1</sub> (projective coordinate in Montgomery residue system) B2 = Y' <sub>1</sub> (projective coordinate in Montgomery residue system) B3 = Z' <sub>1</sub> (projective coordinate in Montgomery residue system) A3 = a' (elliptic curve parameter in Montgomery residue system) B0 = b' (elliptic curve parameter in Montgomery residue system) N0 = prime p (modulus) of the ECC system
Post-conditions	B1 = X' <sub>3</sub> B2 = Y' <sub>3</sub> B3 = Z' <sub>3</sub> A3 = a' B0 = b' Unless explicitly noted, all other registers are <i>not guaranteed</i> to be any particular value.
Special conditions	All variables followed with the tick mark (') indicate it is in the Montgomery residue system. While not explicitly mentioned or necessary, the contents registers A0, A1, and A2 a left undisturbed in anticipation that these will store the generator point (P) during a point multiply.




Figure 7-6. ECC F<sub>D</sub> Point Double Register Usage

## 7.3.4 ECC F<sub>D</sub> Modular Add

Modular addition may be performed on any two vectors loaded into A (A0-A3) and B (B0-B3), where both of these vectors are less than the value stored in the modulus register N (N0-N3). The results are stored in the respective B register. For ECC functionality, this function is used by the point add and point double routines but is available to the host interface - typically for higher-level ECC-related functions. This function operates with a minimum of four digits (Modsize = 3).

Prior to initiating this function, the A, B and N register pointers must be set in the control register which indicate which sub-registers (e.g A0, B0, A1, B1, etc.) are the targeted operands. See Table 7-2 for a detailed description. Once this is performed, the host processor may successfully initiate this function.

	Modular Add
Computation	C = D + E mod N, where D, E, and C are integers and are less than N
Entry name	modularadd
Entry address	0x008(modularadd)
Pre-conditions	A0-3 = D (integer, exact A-location pre-selected in Control Register) B0-3 = E (integer, exact B-location pre-selected in Control Register) N0-3 = prime p (modulus) of the ECC system
Post-conditions	B0-3 = results of modular addition stored where the B operand was located Unless explicitly noted, all other registers are not guaranteed to be any particular value.
Special conditions	The function operates the same regardless of whether or not the operands are in the Montgomery residue system.

Table 7-8. Modular Add




Figure 7-7. Modular Add Register Usage

### 7.3.5 ECC F<sub>p</sub> Modular Subtract

Modular subtraction may be performed on any two vectors loaded into A (A0–A3) and B (B0–B3), where both of these vectors are less than the value stored in the modulus register N (N0–N3). This is accomplished by computing A-B if A > B or A-B+N if A < B. The results are stored in the respective B register. For ECC functionality, this function is used by the point add and point double routines but is available to the host interface. This function operates with a minimum of four digits (Modsize = 3).

Before this function is initialized, the A, B and N register pointers must be set in the control register which indicate which sub-registers (A0, B0, A1, B1, etc.) are the targeted operands. See Table 7-2 for a detailed description. Once this is performed, the host processor may successfully initiate this function.

	Modular Subtract
Computation	C = D - E mod N, where D, E, and C are integers and are less than N
Entry name	modularsubtract;
Entry address	009h(modularsubtract)
Pre-conditions	A0-3 = D (integer, exact A-location pre-selected in Control Register) B0-3 = E (integer, exact B-location pre-selected in Control Register) N0-3 = prime p (modulus) of the ECC system
Post-conditions	B0-3 = results of modular subtraction stored where the B operand was located Unless explicitly noted, all other registers are <i>not guaranteed</i> to be any particular value.
Special conditions	The function operates the same regardless of whether or not the operands are in the Montgomery residue system.

Table 7-9. Modular Subtract




Figure 7-8. Modular Subtract Register Usage

## 7.3.6 ECC $F_p$ Montgomery Modular Multiplication ((A $\times$ B $\times$ $R^{\text{-}1})$ mod N)

The  $(A \times B \times R^{-1})$  mod N calculation is the core function of the PKEU. It is used to assist the point add and double routines in completing their functions. For ECC purposes, this function will rarely be used directly by the host processor. This function operates with a minimum of five digits (Modsize = 4). The complete set of I/O conditions is shown below:

	Modular Multiply
Computation	$C = A * B * R^{-1} \mod N$ , where A, B, and C are integers less than N and $R = 2^{16D}$ where D is the number of digits of the modulus vector
Entry name	modularmultiply
Entry address	0x00a(modularmultiply)
Pre-conditions	A0-3 = A (integer, exact A-location pre-selected in Control Register) B0-3 = B (integer, exact B-location pre-selected in Control Register) N0-3 = prime p (modulus) of the ECC system
Post-conditions	A0-3 = A operand is preserved B0-3 = results of modular multiplication stored where the B operand was located Unless explicitly noted, all other registers are <i>not guaranteed</i> to be any particular value.
Special conditions	Typically, though it is not mandatory, the operands will be in the Montgomery residue system. The only time this would not be the case is when manually placing a value into the Montgomery residue system.




Figure 7-9. Modular Multiplication Register Usage

## 7.3.7 ECC $F_p$ Montgomery Modular Multiplication ((A $\times$ B $\times$ $R^{\text{--}2})$ mod N)

The  $(A \times B \times R^{-2})$  mod N calculation is similar to the standard 'R<sup>-1</sup>' Montgomery multiplication except an additional R is divided out. This function is ideal for those ECC applications which work in affine coordinates. In that case, the host may use this function to exit projective coordinates. For example, the host could find x, for  $x = X/Z^2$ , where X and  $(Z^2)^{-1}$  are in the Montgomery residue system. Loading X and  $(Z^2)^{-1}$  into the appropriate operand registers and initiating this function would yield x which is no longer in the Montgomery residue system. This function operates with a minimum of 5 digits (Modsize = 4). The complete set of I/O conditions is shown below:

Table 7-11. Modular Multiplication (with double reduction	Table 7-11. Modular	r Multiplication	(with double reduction)
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	Modular Multiply (with double reduction)
Computation	$C = A * B * R^{-2}$ mod N, where A, B, and C are integers less than N and $R = 2^{16D}$ where D is the number of digits of the modulus vector
Entry name	modularmultiply2
Entry address	0x00b (modularmultiply2)
Pre-conditions	A0-3 = A (integer, exact A-location pre-selected in Control Register) B0-3 = B (integer, exact B-location pre-selected in Control Register) N0-3 = prime p (modulus) of the ECC system
Post-conditions	A0-3 = A operand is preserved B0-3 = results of modular multiplication stored where the B operand was located Unless explicitly noted, all other registers are not guaranteed to be any particular value.
Special conditions	




Figure 7-10. Modular Multiplication (with double reduction) Register Usage

#### 7.3.8 ECC F<sub>2</sub>m Polynomial-Basis Point Multiply

The PKEU performs the elliptic curve point multiply function which is the highest level of ECC abstraction supported by the device. It is the intention that the host processor use the PKEU in such a way as to support ECC schemes defined in IEEE P1363 (and other ECC standards) where the point multiply is the critical and most computationally intensive, but not final, step in many of these schemes. The point multiply is a nearly fully automated. However, some interaction is required by the host processor (described below).

Point multiplies in  $F_2$ m are carried out by the PKEU by performing repeated point add and point double operations using projective coordinates. As a result, the host processor is responsible for providing the point P represented as the point (X, Y, Z). For systems that do not operate in the projective coordinate scheme (that is, point P is represented as the point (x, y)), X is simply x, Y is y, and Z is 1. The complete set of I/O conditions is shown below:

Table 7-12. ECC F<sub>2</sub>m Point Multiply

	F <sub>2</sub> m Point Multiply
Computation	$Q = k^*P$ , where $Q \equiv (X_3, Y_3, Z_3)$ , $P \equiv (X_1, Y_1, Z_1)$
Entry name	multkPtoQ(will probably be the same as F <sub>p</sub> )
Entry address	0x001(multkPtoQ)
Pre-conditions	A0 = $x_1$ (when XYZ=0) or $X_1$ (when XYZ=1) A1 = $y_1$ (when XYZ=0) or $Y_1$ (when XYZ=1) A2 = ( $z_1$ =1) (when XYZ=0) or $Z_1$ (when XYZ=1) A3 = a elliptic curve parameter B0 = c elliptic curve parameter B1 = $R^2$ mod N value N0 = prime p (modulus) of the ECC system
Run-time conditions	EXP(k) = ms 8-bits of k (provided in 8 bit words throughout the point multiply, msb to lsb); first word provides following routine invocation per ERDY assertion.
Post-conditions	$B1 = X_2 / X'_2 \\ B2 = Y_2 / Y'_2 \\ B3 = Z_2 / Z'_2 \\ A2 = undefined (when XYZ = 1) or Z_2^2 (when XYZ = 0) A3 = undefined (when XYZ = 1) or Z_2^3 (when XYZ = 0) \\ Unless explicitly noted, all other registers are not guaranteed to be any particular value.$
Special conditions	The 'c' elliptic curve parameter is a function of the 'b' parameter and field size: $c = b^{2^{m-2}}$ .

<b>Initial Condition</b>		Final Condition
	B3	Z <sub>2</sub> (or Z' <sub>2</sub> )
	B2	Y <sub>2</sub> (or Y' <sub>2</sub> )
R <sup>2</sup> mod N	B1	X <sub>2</sub> (or X' <sub>2</sub> )
C	B0	?
a	A3	? (or Z <sub>2</sub> <sup>3</sup> )
1 (or Z <sub>1</sub> )	A2	? (or Z <sub>2</sub> <sup>2</sup> )
$y_1$ (or $Y_1$ )	A1	?
$x_1$ (or $X_1$ )	A0	?
		,
	N3	?
	N2	<u>  ?                                   </u>
	N1	<u> </u>
irred. poly.	N0	irred. poly.
	C enabled ECC	same
k (run-	'- <del> </del>	?
	ect '1' or '0' XYZ	same
'1'-F <sub>2</sub>	m enabled F2M	same
	set Modsize	same
	set EXP(k)_SIZE	same

Figure 7-11. ECC F<sub>2</sub>m Point Multiply I/O

It is important to note that unlike the RSA exponentiation routine, the point to be multiplied is not expected to be in the Montgomery residue system when loaded into the PKEU. All of the other ECC parameters are also expected to be loaded in standard format. This includes the a, c, and modulus parameters of the ECC system. In addition, the "R<sup>2</sup> mod N" term is also required. This term is used by the PKEU to put the operands in the Montgomery residue system. See the full description of this function below.

It is the responsibility of the host processor to provide multiplier data to the accelerator during the operation. That is, the 'k' from the point multiplication 'kP' must be provided dynamically by the host micro-processor in 32-bit words. Note that the host must supply the k data starting with the most significant 32-bit word and working down to the least significant word. Each individual word, however, is formatted msb to lsb (i.e. "k\_word[msb:lsb]").

PKEU asserts the IRQ signal when it is ready to accept more data. This tells the host processor to read the status word to see what was set. If the E\_RDY bit is set (or pin IRDY\_B active low), the host processor knows it must provide the next word of k - this data is written into the EXP(k) register one 32-bit word at a time. If this interrupt is masked, then it must poll the status register to determine when to provide the next word of k. The host should not look for the assertion of E\_RDY until after the routine (i.e. PKCR[GO] bit). Any data written to EXP(K) prior to this will be ignored.

The point multiplication is optimized to efficiently produce results for systems that work in the projective coordinate scheme but can accelerate affine schemes as well. The host processor selects the scheme via the CR XYZ-bit. For affine coordinate systems (XYZ = 0):

The results of the calculation are returned to the A and B storage registers. Note that these values correspond to the projective coordinate values X, Y, Z,  $Z^2$ , and  $Z^3$ . X, Y, and Z are in the Montgomery residue system. In order to put the projective coordinates into their affine form, the following equations which define their relationships must be calculated:

$$x = X/Z^{2};$$
  
 $y = Y/Z^{3};$ 

Since the PKEU does not support the inverse function, it is the responsibility of the host processor to find  $(Z^2)^{-1}$  and  $(Z^3)^{-1}$  by using any number of available modulo-irreducible-polynomial inversion techniques. Once this is accomplished, the host may then provide these values back to the PKEU to perform the final two *field* multiplications to find x and y. It is advisable that the user perform these multiplications in the PKEU to remove the values from the Montgomery residue system.

For projective coordinate systems (XYZ = 1):

The results of the calculation are returned to the B memory. Note that these values correspond to the projective coordinate values X, Y, and Z and are *no longer* in the Montgomery residue system. The host may take these results as the complete point multiply (including the exit from the Montgomery residue system) (e.g.  $(XR)(Z^2)^{-1}R^{-1}$  modN = X).

The following restrictions apply to the point multiply:

- The value of the k vector must be greater than one for this function to work properly.
- The point multiply operates with a minimum of five digits (Modsize = 4).

## 7.3.9 ECC F<sub>2</sub>m Point Add

This function is extensively utilized by the point multiply routine. However, its value as a stand-alone routine to the host processor is extremely limited. As a result, the information provided on the routine is primarily for testing and debug purposes.

Table 7-13. ECC F<sub>2</sub>m Point Add

	F <sub>2</sub> m Point Add
Computation	$R = P + Q$ , where $R \equiv (X_3, Y_3, Z_3)$ , $P \equiv (X_1, Y_1, Z_1)$ , and $Q \equiv (X_2, Y_2, Z_2)$
Entry name	F₂maddPtoQ
Entry address	0x005(F <sub>2</sub> maddPtoQ)
Pre-conditions	A0 = X' <sub>1</sub> (projective coordinate in Montgomery residue system) A1 = Y' <sub>1</sub> (projective coordinate in Montgomery residue system) A2 = Z' <sub>1</sub> (projective coordinate in Montgomery residue system) A3 = a' (elliptic curve parameter in Montgomery residue system) B0 = c' (elliptic curve parameter in Montgomery residue system) B1 = X' <sub>2</sub> (projective coordinate in Montgomery residue system) B2 = Y' <sub>2</sub> (projective coordinate in Montgomery residue system) B3 = Z' <sub>2</sub> (projective coordinate in Montgomery residue system) N0 = irreducible polynomial of the ECC system
Post-conditions	$A0 = X'_1$ $A1 = Y'_1$ $A2 = Z'_1$ $A3 = a'$ $B0 = c'$ $B1 = X'_3$ $B2 = Y'_3$ $B3 = Z'_3$ Unless explicitly noted, all other registers are <i>not guaranteed</i> to be any particular value.
Special conditions	The c elliptic curve parameter is a function of the 'b' parameter and field size: $c=b^{2^{m-2}}$ . All variables followed with the tick mark (') indicate it is in the Montgomery residue system.




Figure 7-12. ECC F<sub>2</sub>m Point Add Register Usage

## 7.3.10 ECC F<sub>2</sub>m Point Double

This function is extensively utilized by the point multiply routine. However, its value as a stand-alone routine to the host processor is extremely limited. As a result, the information provided on the routine is primarily for testing and debug purposes.

Table 7-14. ECC F<sub>2</sub>m Point Double

	F <sub>2</sub> m Point Double
Computation	$R = Q + Q = 2 * Q$ , where $R = (X_3, Y_3, Z_3)$ , and $Q = (X_3, Y_3, Z_3)$
Entry name	F <sub>2</sub> mdoubleQ
Entry address	0x006(F <sub>2</sub> mdoubleQ)
Pre-conditions	B1 = X' <sub>1</sub> (projective coordinate in Montgomery residue system) B2 = Y' <sub>1</sub> (projective coordinate in Montgomery residue system) B3 = Z' <sub>1</sub> (projective coordinate in Montgomery residue system) A3 = a' (elliptic curve parameter in Montgomery residue system) B0 = c' (elliptic curve parameter in Montgomery residue system) N0 = prime p (modulus) of the ECC system
Post-conditions	$B1 = X'_3$ $B2 = Y'_3$ $B3 = Z'_3$ $A3 = a'$ $B0 = c'$ Unless explicitly noted, all other registers are <i>not guaranteed</i> to be any particular value.
Special conditions	The c elliptic curve parameter is a function of the 'b' parameter and field size: $c=b^{2^{m-2}}$ . All variables followed with the tick mark (') indicate it is in the Montgomery residue system. While not explicitly mentioned or necessary, the contents registers A0, A1, and A2 a left undisturbed in anticipation that these will store the generator point (P) during a point multiply.




Figure 7-13. ECC F<sub>2</sub>m Point Double Register Usage

#### 7.3.11 ECC F<sub>2</sub>m Add (Subtract)

Field addition in  $F_2m$  (polynomial-basis) may be performed on any two vectors loaded into A (A0-A3) and B (B0-B3), where both of these vectors are less than the value stored in the modulus (irreducible polynomial) register N (N0-N3). The results are stored in the respective B register. In  $F_2m$ , this function provides identical results for both addition as well as subtraction, therefore, it is sufficient to support both of these functions with this single routine. This function operates with a minimum of 4 digits (Modsize = 3).

Prior to initiating this function, the A, B, and N register pointers must be set in the control register which indicate which sub-registers (e.g A0, B0, A1, B1, etc.) are the targeted operands. See Section 7.1.2, "Control Register (PKCR)," for a detailed description. Once this is performed, the host processor may successfully initiate this function.

	F <sub>2</sub> m Modular Add (Subtract)
Computation	C = D + E mod N, where D, E, and C are integers and are less than N
Entry name	modularadd (same as with integer add)
Entry address	0x008(modularadd)
Pre-conditions	A0-3 = D (binary polynomial, exact A-location pre-selected in control register) B0-3 = E (binary polynomial, exact B-location pre-selected in control register) N0-3 = irreducible polynomial of the ECC system
Post-conditions	B0-3 = results of modular addition (subtraction) stored where the B operand was located Unless explicitly noted, all other registers are <i>not guaranteed</i> to be any particular value.
Special conditions	The function operates the same regardless of whether or not the operands are in the Montgomery residue system.

Table 7-15. F<sub>2</sub>m Modular Add (Subtract)




Figure 7-14. F<sub>2</sub>m Modular Add (Subtract) Register Usage

# 7.3.12 ECC $F_2$ m Montgomery Modular Multiplication ( $(A \times B \times R^{-1}) \mod N$ )

The  $(A \times B \times R^{-1})$  mod N calculation is the core function of the PKEU. This function is used to assist the point add and double routines in completing their functions. For ECC purposes, this function will rarely be used directly by the host processor. This function operates with a minimum of 5 digits (Modsize = 4). The complete set of I/O conditions is shown below:

Table 7-16. F<sub>2</sub>m Modular Multiplication

	F <sub>2</sub> m Modular Multiply		
Computation	$C = A * B * R^{-1}$ mod N, where A, B, and C are integers less than N and $R = 2^{16D}$ where D is the number of digits of the modulus vector		
Entry name	modularmultiply (same for F <sub>p</sub> or F <sub>2</sub> m)		
Entry address	0x00a(modularmultiply)		
Pre-conditions	A0-3 = A (binary polynomial, exact A-location pre-selected in Control Register) B0-3 = B (binary polynomial, exact B-location pre-selected in Control Register) N0-3 = irreducible polynomial of the ECC system		
Post-conditions	A0-3 = A operand is preserved B0-3 = results of modular multiplication stored where the B operand was located Unless explicitly noted, all other registers are <i>not guaranteed</i> to be any particular value.		
Special conditions	Typically, though it is not mandatory, the operands will be in the Montgomery residue system. The only time this would not be the case is when manually placing a value into the Montgomery residue system.		




Figure 7-15. F<sub>2</sub>m Modular Multiplication Register Usage

# 7.3.13 ECC $F_2$ m Montgomery Modular Multiplication ( $(A \times B \times R^{-2}) \mod N$ )

The  $(A \times B \times R^{-2})$  mod N calculation is similar to the standard 'R<sup>-1</sup>' Montgomery multiplication except an additional R is divided out. This function is ideal for those ECC applications which work in affine coordinates. In that case, the host may use this function to exit projective coordinates. For example, the host could find x, for  $x = X/Z^2$ , where X and  $(Z^2)^{-1}$  are in the Montgomery residue system. Loading X and  $(Z^2)^{-1}$  into the appropriate operand registers and initiating this function would yield x which is no longer in the Montgomery residue system. This function operates with a minimum of 5 digits (Modsize = 4). The complete set of I/O conditions is shown below:

Table 7-17. F<sub>2</sub>m Modular Multiplication (with double reduction)

	F <sub>2</sub> m Modular Multiply (with double reduction)		
Computation	C = A * B * $R^{-2}$ mod N, where A, B, and C are binary polynomials with order than N and R = $2^{16D}$ where D is the number of digits of the irreducible polynomial		
Entry name	modularmultiply2 (same as F <sub>p</sub> )		
Entry address	0x00b (modularmultiply2)		
Pre-conditions	A0-3 = A (binary polynomial, exact A-location pre-selected in Control Register) B0-3 = B (binary polynomial, exact B-location pre-selected in Control Register) N0-3 = irreducible polynomial of the ECC system		
Post-conditions	A0-3 = A operand is preserved B0-3 = results of modular multiplication stored where the B operand was located Unless explicitly noted, all other registers are <i>not guaranteed</i> to be any particular value.		
Special conditions			




Figure 7-16. F<sub>2</sub>m Modular Multiplication (with double reduction) Register Usage

# 7.4 RSA Routines

For the RSA-related descriptions which follow, it is generally recommended that all memory block pointers (regAsel, regBsel, etc.) are set to zero. For the modular exponentiation routine, the pointers are actually ignored. For the multiplies, add, subtract, and R<sup>2</sup> functions, it is possible to set these pointers and have the PKEU adhere to these settings.

While potentially dangerous due to the commonly large sizes of RSA operands, this flexibility is allowed to support Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT). CRT often generates intermediate values which must be stored for later use. By using pointers, these values may be stored in the PKEU and efficiently used again without the host having to store/retrieve these values to/from general memory. It is left to the application developer to use these tools to support CRT.

# 7.4.1 $(A \times R^{-1})^{EXP} \mod N$

The PKEU carries out exponentiations by repeated multiply operations. The multiplies are controlled internally by the PKEU, however, it is the responsibility of the host processor to provide exponent data (32-bit words at a time) to the accelerator *during* the operation. Note that the host must supply the exponent data starting with the most significant 32-bit word and working down to the least significant word. Each individual word, however, is formatted msb to lsb (i.e. "exp\_word[msb:lsb]").

PKEU asserts the IRDY\_B and IRQ signals when it is ready to accept more exponent data (IRQ only if E\_RDY is not masked). This tells the host processor to read the SR to see what was set. If the E\_RDY bit is set, the host processor knows it must provide the next word of the exponent - this data is written into the EXP(k) register one 32-bit word at a time. If this interrupt bit is masked, then it must poll the status register to determine when to provide the next word of the exponent. The host should not look for the assertion of E\_RDY until after the routine (i.e. CR[GO] bit). Data previously written to EXP(K) is ignored.

The data to be exponentiated must be provided in the Montgomery format. Consider the vector A', the data to be exponentiated where  $A' = AR \mod N$ . By providing A', the results of  $(A' \times R^{-1})^{EXP} \mod N$  yields  $(A \times R \times R^{-1})^{EXP} \mod N$ , or equivalently,  $(A)^{EXP} \mod N$ .

The result of the calculation is returned to the B storage register. Note that this value has no remaining R terms and therefore is no longer in Montgomery format. The value of the exponent vector must be greater than one for this function to work properly. This function operates with a minimum of 5 digits (Modsize = 4). The exponent may be as small as one byte (EXP(k)\_SIZE = 0). The complete set of I/O conditions is shown below:

**Table 7-18. Integer Modular Exponentiation** 

	Integer Modular Exponentiation		
Computation	$S = (A' * R^{-1})^{EXP} \mod N$		
Entry name	ехрА		
Entry address	0x007(expA)		
Pre-conditions	A0-3 = A' (the value A in the Montgomery residue system) N0-3 = modulus		
Run-time conditions	EXP(k) = msb exponent word (provided in 8-bit words throughout the exponentiation); first word provides following routine invocation per ERDY assertion.		
Post-conditions	B0-3 = S Unless explicitly noted, all other registers are <i>not guaranteed</i> to be any particular value.		
Special conditions	A, N, and B have the lsb digits in A0, N0, and B0, respectively. As required, data will occupy the more significant memory blocks.		




Figure 7-17. Integer Modular Exponentiation Register Usage

# 7.4.2 RSA Montgomery Modular Multiplication ((A $\times$ B $\times$ R<sup>-1</sup>) mod N)

The  $(A \times B \times R^{-1})$  mod N calculation is the core function of the PKEU. It is used to assist the exponentiation routine in completing its operation though it is also available to the host processor - typically to put messages into the Montgomery format. This function operates with a minimum of five digits (Modsize = 4). The complete set of I/O conditions is shown below:

<b>Table 7-19</b>	. Modular	Multiplication
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	Modular Multiply		
Computation	$C = A * B * R^{-1}$ mod N, where A, B, and C are integers less than N and $R = 2^{16D}$ where D is the number of digits of the modulus vector		
Entry name	modularmultiply		
Entry address	0x00a(modularmultiply)		
Pre-conditions	A0-3 = A B0-3 = B N0-3 = modulus		
Post-conditions	A0-3 = A operand is preserved B0-3 = results of modular multiplication stored where the B operand was located Unless explicitly noted, all other registers are not guaranteed to be any particular value.		
Special conditions	Typically, though it is not mandatory, the operands will be in the Montgomery residue system. The only time this would not be the case is when manually placing a value into the Montgomery residue system.		




Figure 7-18. Modular Multiplication Register Usage

Prior to initiating this function, the A and B register pointers must be set in the control register which indicate which sub-registers (e.g A0, B0, A1, B1, etc.) are the targeted operands. See Table 7-2 for a detailed description. Once this is performed, the host processor may successfully initiate this function.

# 7.4.3 RSA Montgomery Modular Multiplication ( $(A \times B \times R^{-2}) \mod N$ )

The  $(A \times B \times R^{-2})$  mod N calculation is similar to the standard 'R<sup>-1</sup>' Montgomery multiplication except an additional R is divided out. This function is particularly helpful when using the Chinese Remainder Theorem. This function operates with a minimum of five digits (Modsize = 4). The complete set of I/O conditions is shown below:

**Table 7-20. Modular Multiplication (with double reduction)** 

	Modular Multiply (with double reduction)		
Computation	C = A * B * R $^{-2}$ mod N, where A, B, and C are integers less than N and R = $2^{16D}$ where D is the number of digits of the modulus vector		
Entry name	modularmultiply2		
Entry address	0x00b(modularmultiply2)		
Pre-conditions	A0-3 = A B0-3 = B N0-3 = modulus		
Post-conditions	A0-3 = A operand is preserved B0-3 = results of modular multiplication stored where the B operand was located Unless explicitly noted, all other registers are <i>not guaranteed</i> to be any particular value.		
Special conditions			




Figure 7-19. Modular Multiplication (with double reduction) Register Usage

### 7.4.4 RSA Modular Add

residue system.

Modular addition may be performed on any two vectors loaded into A (A0-A3) and B (B0-B3), where both of these vectors are less than the value stored in the modulus register N (N0-N3). The results are stored in the respective B register. This function is particularly helpful when using the Chinese Remainder Theorem. This function operates with a minimum of 4 digits (Modsize = 3).

Prior to initiating this function, the A and B register pointers must be set in the control register which indicate which sub-registers (e.g A0, B0, A1, B1, etc.) are the targeted operands. See Table 7-2 for a detailed description. Once this is performed, the host processor may successfully initiate this function.

Modular Add Computation C = D + E mod N, where D, E, and C are integers and are less than N modularadd Entry name Entry address 0x008(modularadd) A0-3 = DPre-conditions B0-3 = EN0-3 = modulusPost-conditions B0-3 = results of modular addition stored where the B operand was located Unless explicitly noted, all other registers are not guaranteed to be any particular value. The function operates the same regardless of whether or not the operands are in the Montgomery Special

Table 7-21. Modular Add




Figure 7-20. Modular Add Register Usage

conditions

# 7.4.5 RSA F<sub>p</sub> Modular Subtract

Modular addition may be performed on any two vectors loaded into A (A0-A3) and B (B0-B3), where both of these vectors are less than the value stored in the modulus register N (N0-N3). This is accomplished by computing A-B if A > B or A-B+N if A < B. The results are stored in the respective B register. This function is particularly helpful when using the Chinese Remainder Theorem. This function operates with a minimum of 4 digits (Modsize = 3).

Prior to initiating this function, the A and B register pointers must be set in the control register which indicate which sub-registers (e.g A0, B0, A1, B1, etc.) are the targeted operands. See Table 7-2 for a detailed description. Once this is performed, the host processor may successfully initiate this function.

	Modular Subtract		
Computation	C = D - E mod N, where D, E, and C are integers and are less than N		
Entry name	modularsubtract		
Entry address	0x009(modularsubtract)		
Pre-conditions	A0-3 = D B0-3 = E N0-3 = modulus		
Post-conditions	B0-3 = results of modular subtraction stored where the B operand was located Unless explicitly noted, all other registers are <i>not guaranteed</i> to be any particular value.		
Special conditions	The function operates the same regardless of whether or not the operands are in the Montgomery residue system.		

Table 7-22. Modular Subtract




Figure 7-21. Modular Subtract Register Usage

# 7.5 Miscellaneous Routines

The remaining routines are general in nature and are not specific to any particular cryptographic algorithm.

# 7.5.1 Clear Memory

This routine clears all of the RAM memory locations in the PKEU. This includes the A, B, and N RAMs. All locations are set to zero. All other registers are cleared either via a reset (software or hardware) or by explicitly writing zeros to each register. Following a reset (software or hardware), this routine is automatically invoked. This accounts for the majority of time between reset and the assertion of the DONE bit in the status register.

**Table 7-23. Clear Memory** 

	Clear Memory		
Computation	A, B, N, and t memories are overwritten with zeros		
Entry name	clearmemory		
Entry address	0x00d(r2)		
Pre-conditions	_		
Post-conditions	A = B = N = 0 (all locations) Unless explicitly noted, all other registers are <i>not guaranteed</i> to be any particular value.		
Special conditions			




Figure 7-22. Clear Memory Register Usage

# 7.5.2 R<sup>2</sup> mod N Calculation

The PKEU has the capability to calculate  $R^2 \mod N$ , where  $R = 2^{16D}$  and D is the number of digits of the modulus vector (Modsize+1, where Modsize is specified independently). This function is used to assist in placing operands into the Montgomery residue system. When possible, this value should be pre-computed. If this value is not available, then the host processor may invoke this function to determine the value before the operation. This function takes a non-trivial amount of time (see Table 7-26) so if at all possible, this value should be stored for future use.

Note that this operation primarily exists to support RSA operations since  $R^2$  mod N may not always be known prior to the execution of certain protocols. For ECC applications, the modulus is a system-wide parameter, which means that the  $R^2$  mod N value may be pre-computed before any real-time operations by any other system entity and stored for future use. For this reason,  $R^2$  mod N only supports integer-modulo-n computations (i.e. the control register bit  $F_2M$  must be 0).

This function operates with a minimum of 4 digits (Modsize = 3) and with the most significant digit (16-bits) of the modulus being non-zero. The complete set of I/O conditions is shown below:

Table 7-24, R<sup>2</sup> mod N

	R <sup>2</sup> mod N
Computation	$R^2$ mod N, where $R = 2^{16D}$ and D is the number of digits of the modulus vector
Entry name	r2
Entry address	0x00c(r2)
Pre-conditions	Modsize = number of digits of the modulus vector - 1 N0-3 = modulus
Post-conditions	$B1 = R^2 \mod N$ N0-3 = modulus Unless explicitly noted, all other registers are not guaranteed to be any particular value.
Special conditions	_




Figure 7-23. R<sup>2</sup> mod N Register Usage

# 7.5.3 $R_pR_N$ mod P Calculation

The PKEU has the ability to calculate  $R_pR_N$  mod P, where  $R_p=2^{16D}$ , and  $R_N=2^{16E}$ ; D is the number of digits of the modulus P, and E is the number of digits of the modulus N, and D + 4 < E. This constant is used in performing Chinese Remainder Theorem calculations given modulus  $N=P\times Q$ , where P and Q are prime numbers. Although labelled  $R_PR_N$  mod P, this function can also compute  $R_QR_N$  mod Q. The requirement D + 4 < E is not a requirement of the command, but a system requirement, as for all subfunctions of Chinese Remainder Theorem to be executable on the PKEU, the number of digits of P and Q must each be at least five.

As with the standard  $R^2$  mod N operation, this operation exists primarily to support RSA and only works with the Control Register  $F_2M$  bit set to zero.

To use this function, MOD\_SIZE must be programmed with D-1, and EXP\_SIZE must be programmed with E-1, and the prime modulus (either P or Q) is written into memory N. The complete set of I/O conditions is shown in Table 7-26.

Table 7-25.  $R_pR_N \mod P$ 

	R <sub>p</sub> R <sub>N</sub> mod P
Computation	$R_pR_N$ mod P, where $R_p=2^{16D}$ , and $R_N=2^{16E}$ ; D is the number of digits of the modulus P, and E is the number of digits of the modulus N, and D + 4 < E
Entry name	r2
Entry address	0x00c(r2)
Pre-conditions	Modsize = number of digits of the vector D - 1 EXP(k) SIZE = number of digits of the vector E-1
Post-conditions	$\begin{array}{l} \text{B0-3} = \text{R}_{\text{p}}\text{R}_{\text{N}} \text{ mod P} \\ \text{N0-3} = \text{modulus} \\ \text{Unless explicitly noted, all other registers are not guaranteed to be any particular value.} \end{array}$
Special conditions	




Figure 7-24.  $R_PR_N$  mod P Register Usage

# 7.6 Embedded Routine Performance

The formulas listed in Table 7-26 show the run times for the PKHA embedded routines. Many of these are data dependent, which result in variable length run times. For these cases, the average run-time is noted.

Table 7-26. Run Time Formulas

Operation	Symbol	Run-Time Formula <sup>1</sup>
multPtoQ	t <sub>mulfp</sub> (avg)	$Ne^{*} t_{dblfp} + 0.5^{*}Ne^{*} t_{addfp} + 8^{*}(t_{mult1}) + 6^{*}(MS)_{move}$
FpaddPtoQ	t <sub>addfp</sub>	$16*(t_{\text{mult1}}) + 4*(t_{\text{add}}) + 5*(t_{\text{sub}}) + 19*(MS)_{\text{move}}$
FpdoubleQ	t <sub>dblfp</sub>	$10*(t_{\text{mult}1}) + 11*(t_{\text{add}})+2*(t_{\text{sub}}) + 10*(MS)_{\text{move}}$
multPtoQ	t <sub>mulf2m</sub> (avg)	Ne* t <sub>dblf2m</sub> + 0.5*Ne* t <sub>addf2m</sub> + 8*(t <sub>mult1</sub> ) + 6*(MS) <sub>move</sub>
F2maddPtoQ	t <sub>addf2m</sub>	$20*(t_{mult1}) + 7*(t_{add}) + 15*(MS)_{move}$
F2mdoubleQ	t <sub>dblf2m</sub>	$10*(t_{\text{mult}1}) + 4*(t_{\text{add}}) + 9*(MS)_{\text{move}}$
expA	t <sub>exp</sub> (avg)	1.5*Ne*[t <sub>mult1</sub> ] + t <sub>mult1</sub> (wcs)
modularmultiply	t <sub>mult1</sub> (wcs) t <sub>mult1</sub> (bcs)	(1/F) * [(MS) <sup>2</sup> + 10*(MS)+ 27] (1/F) * [(MS) <sup>2</sup> + 9*(MS)+ 22]
modularmultiply2	t <sub>mult2</sub> (wcs) t <sub>mult2</sub> (bcs)	(1/F) *2* [(MS) <sup>2</sup> + 10*(MS)+ 27] (1/F) *2* [(MS) <sup>2</sup> + 9*(MS)+ 22]
modularadd	t <sub>add</sub> (wcs) t <sub>add</sub> (bcs)	(1/F) * [4*(MS)+ 11] (1/F) * [3*(MS)+ 6]
modularsub	t <sub>sub</sub> (wcs) t <sub>sub</sub> (bcs)	(1/F) * [3*(MS)+ 11] (1/F) * [2*(MS)+ 6]
r2	t <sub>r2</sub>	<tbd></tbd>
clearmemory	t <sub>clr_ram</sub>	(1/F) * 4 * (MS+ 5)

For these formulas, the following definitions apply:

MS = number of 16-bit blocks in the modulus (that is, the value assigned to the Modsize reg. plus one)

Ne = number of bits in the exponent or multiplier (k)

avg = average run time (applied to a nominal case which assumes 50% 1's = in Ne

wcs = worst-case run time

bcs = best-case run time

### NOTE:

When  $t_{mult1}$  without references to wcs or bcs is encountered, assume that for 75% of the time, bcs will occur and for the other 25%, wcs (i.e.  $t_{mult1} \leftrightarrow 0.75*t_{mult1}$ (bcs) +  $0.25*t_{mult1}$ (wcs)).

The formulas given for  $t_{mulfp}$  and  $t_{mulf2m}$  are for XYZ bit of the Control Register set to one. If set to zero, the run-time would be nearly identical but additional support from the host processor would be required to fully complete the operation. See the point multiply descriptions in Embedded Routine Reference section for more details.

F = operating frequency

# **Embedded Routine Performance**

# **Chapter 8 Random Number Generator**

This chapter explains how to program the RNG (Random Number Generator) to create a random number.

## 8.1 Overview

The RNG is a digital integrated circuit capable of generating 32-bit random numbers. It is designed to comply with the FIPS-140 standard for randomness and non-determinism. A linear feedback shift register (LSFR) and cellular automata shift register (CASR) are operated in parallel to generate pseudo-random data.

# 8.2 Functional Description

The RNG consists of six major functional blocks:

- Bus Interface Unit (BIU)
- Linear Feedback Shift Register (LFSR)
- Cellular Automata Shift Register (CASR)
- Clock Controller
- 2 Ring Oscillators

The states of the LFSR and CASR are advanced at unknown frequencies determined by the two ring oscillator clocks and the clock control. When a read is performed, the oscillator clocks are halted and a collection of bits from the LFSR and CASR are x'ored together to obtain the 32-bit random output. The BIU interfaces with the External Bus Interface (EBI) to allow communication between the EBI and the RNG.

# 8.3 Typical Operation

A typical procedure for reading random data is as follows. When a given operation calls for random data, the CPU writes the number of 32-bit random words required to the MPC180 EBI, specifically to the Output Buffer Count Register (see section 3.3.1.5). The EBI monitors the ORDY bit in the RNG Status Register (Fig 8-1). This bit signals whether the random data is ready. Once the ORDY bit goes low, the EBI reads the 32-bit word from the RNG Random Output Register (Table 8-1) and writes it to the MPC180 Output FIFO,

### **Random Number Generator Registers**

repeating this process until the required number of 32-bit random words have been generated. Reads by the EBI can be repeated as soon as the ORDY bit is driven high again. The process is outlined as follows:

- CPU sets up MPC180 EBI to generate required number of random words.
- EBI waits for ORDY signal to be driven low.
- EBI reads autorand (Automatic Random Output Register), writes to Output FIFO.
- Repeat previous steps until Output Buffer Count Register reaches zero.

At this point, the EBI can generate an interrupt to inform the CPU that the required number of random words is waiting in the Output FIFO. These random words can be read by the CPU for immediate write back to the MPC180, or written into memory for later use.

# 8.4 Random Number Generator Registers

Table 8-1 shows RNG registers.

**Table 8-1. Random Number Generator Registers** 

MPC180 12-Bit Address	Processor 32-Bit Address	Register	Туре
0x600	0x0000_1800	Status	R
0x602	0x0000_1808	Autorand output	R

# 8.4.1 Status Register

Figure 8-1 shows the RNG status register.




Figure 8-1. RNG Status Register

Table 8-2 describes the RNG status register fields.

**Table 8-2. RNG Status Register Field Descriptions** 

Bits	Name	Description
0–17	_	Reserved.
18	ORDY	The ORDY bit will be driven high when random data is ready. If the user performs a read of the Random Output Register while the ORDY bit is low, the RNG will assert wait states until the ORDY bit goes high.
19–30	_	Reserved.
31	ON/OFF	A value of 1 indicates that the RNG is on and the shift registers are randomizing.

# **Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations**

The glossary contains an alphabetical list of terms, phrases, and abbreviations used in this book. Some of the terms and definitions included in the glossary are reprinted from IEEE Std 754-1985, IEEE Standard for Binary Floating-Point Arithmetic, copyright ©1985 by the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. with the permission of the IEEE.

### Α

- **AES**. The Advanced Encryption Standard that will eventually replace DES (Data Encryption Standard) around the turn of the century. The Rijndael algorithm has been chosen for the AES.
- **AFEU.** Arc Four Execution Unit. Encryption engine which implements a stream cipher compatible with the RC4 algorithm from RSA Security, Inc.
- **Authentication.** The action of verifying information such as identity, ownership, or authorization.
- **Architecture.** A detailed specification of requirements for a processor or computer system. It does not specify details of how the processor or computer system must be implemented; instead it provides a template for a family of compatible *implementations*.

### B

- **Big-endian**. A byte-ordering method in memory where the address n of a word corresponds to the *most-significant byte*. In an addressed memory word, the bytes are ordered (left to right) 0, 1, 2, 3, with 0 being the most-significant byte. See *Little-endian*.
- **Block cipher.** A symmetric cipher which encrypts a message by breaking it down into blocks and encrypting each block.
- **Block cipher based MAC**. MAC that is performed by using a block cipher as a keyed compression function.
- **Buffer count registers.** Contain the number of 32-bit words to be transferred to/from an execution unit for a given operation.

- **Bulk Data Encryption.** The process of converting plaintext to ciphertext. Refers to encryption operations other than key exchange and hashing.
- **Burst**. A multiple-word data transfer whose total size is typically equal to a cache block. In MPC8260 mode, eight words.
- **C** CBC. Cipher block chaining. Mode of DES encryption which uses IVs which are altered by the context of the preceding block.
  - **Chinese Remainder Theorem.** Mathematical theorem based on the congruence of greatest common denominator and least common multiple. CRT is used in support of asymmetric key exchange.
  - **Ciphertext.** Text (any information) which has been encrypted so as to render it unreadable by parties without the proper decryption keys.
  - **Clear**. To cause a bit or bit field to register a value of zero. See also *Set*.
  - **Context.** Information associated with an encryption/decryption operation. Typical context constituents are session keys, initialization vectors, and security associations.
  - **Context memory.** Local or system memory reserved for storage of security context information.
  - **Context switching.** The act of changing session-specific parameters, such as Keys and IVs, between the end of the current packet and the next.
  - **Cryptography.** The art and science of using mathematics to secure information and create a high degree of trust in the electronic realm. See also public key, secret key, symmetric-key, and threshold cryptography.
  - **Crypto-analysis.** The art and science of code breaking. Develops methods of attacking encryption algorithms to recover plaintext in significantly less time that brute force attacks.
- **D Decryption.** The process of converting ciphertext to plaintext. Also referred to as decoding.
  - **DES.** Data encryption standard. A *block cipher* that uses a 56-bit key to encrypt 64-bit blocks of data, one block at a time.
  - **3DES.** Triple DES. Encryption operation which permutes 64 bit blocks of plaintext with 64 bit keys three times. Triple DES is exponentially stronger than single DES encryption.

- **Diffie-Hellman key exchange.** A key exchange protocol allowing the participants to agree on a key over an insecure channel.
- **Digest.** Commonly used to refer to the output of a hash function, e.g. message digest refers to the hash of a message.
- **Digital signature**. The encryption of a message digest with a private key.
- **DMA.** Direct Memory Access.
- **DSA.** Digital Signature Algorithm. DSA is a public-key method based on the discrete logarithm problem. Proposed by NIST.
- **DSS.** Digital signature standard proposed by NIST.
- **E** EBI. External Bus Interface. A functional block in the MPC180 that mediates between internal and external signals.
  - **ECB.** Electronic code book. A mode of DES which uses initialization vectors that are not modified by processing of the previous packet.
  - **ECC.** Elliptic curve cryptosystem. A public-key cryptosystem based on the properties of elliptic curves.
  - **Elliptic curve.** The set of points (x, y) satisfying an equation of the form y2 = x3 + ax + b, for variables x, y and constants a, b Î F, where F is a field.
  - **Encryption.** The transformation of plaintext into an apparently less readable form (called ciphertext) through a mathematical process. The ciphertext may be read by anyone who has the key that decrypts (undoes the encryption) the ciphertext.
  - **Execution unit.** Any device or silicon block which accelerates the mathematical transformations associated with key exchange, data authentication, and bulk data encryption.
  - **Exponent**. In the binary representation of a floating-point number, the exponent is the component that normally signifies the integer power to which the value two is raised in determining the value of the represented number.
  - External Bus Interface. See EBI.
- **FIFO.** First in, first out. A buffer memory which supports in-order processing of data.
  - **FIPS.** Federal Information Protection Standards.

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Glossarv-3

- **Fraction**. In the binary representation of a floating-point number, the field of the *significand* that lies to the right of its implied binary point.
- Hashing. A function that takes a variable sized input and has a fixed size output.
  - **HMAC.** Hashed message authentication code. MAC that uses a hash function to reduce the size of the data it processes.
  - **IKE**. Internet Key Exchange. A process used by two more parties to exchange keys via the Internet, for future secure communication via the Internet.
- Initialization Vector. Secret value that, along with the key, is shared by both encryptor and decryptor. It is a string of bits used in lieu of plaintext at the start of DES. Used in *CBC* (Cipher Block Chaining) to complicate crypto-analysis.
  - **Interrupt**. An asynchronous exception. On PowerPC processors, interrupts are a special case of exceptions.
  - **Interrupt controller.** Organizes the hardware interrupts coming from the execution units into a maskable interrupt for the processor
  - **Interrupt mask register.** Allows masking of individual interrupts by the host.
  - **IPSec.** A standard suite of protocols governing key exchange, authentication, and encryption of IP packets for transport or tunneling over the Internet.
  - **IV.** See *Initialization vector*.
- **Key.** A string of bits used widely in cryptography, allowing people to encrypt and decrypt data; a key can be used to perform other mathematical operations as well. Given a cipher, a key determines the mapping of the plaintext to the ciphertext.

- Latency. The number of clock cycles necessary to execute an instruction and make ready the results of that execution for a subsequent instruction.
  - **Least-significant bit (lsb)**. The bit of least value in an address, register, data element, or instruction encoding.
  - **Least-significant byte (LSB)**. The byte of least value in an address, register, data element, or instruction encoding.
  - **Little-endian**. A byte-ordering method in memory where the address n of a word corresponds to the *least-significant byte*. In an addressed memory word, the bytes are ordered (left to right) 3, 2, 1, 0, with 3 being the *most-significant byte*. See *Big-endian*.
- Masking. Hiding internal interrupts and signals from the external interface via control registers.
  - **MD4.** Message Digest 4. Hashing algorithm developed by Rivest which processes a series of 512-bit message blocks and produces a single 128-bit Hash representing the original message.
  - **MD5.** Message Digest 5. Hashing algorithm developed by Rivest which pads (if necessary) the message to be hashed to create a 512 bit block. This block is compressed by XOR-ing two inputs: the 512-bit message block, and a 128-bit key. Stronger than MD.
  - **MDEU.** Message Digest Execution Unit. A device or silicon block which accelerates the hashing functions associated with message authentication.
  - Memory-mapped accesses. Accesses whose addresses use the page or block address translation mechanisms provided by the MMU and that occur externally with the bus protocol defined for memory.
  - **Message Authentication Code (MAC).** A MAC is a function that takes a variable length input and a key to produce a fixed-length output. See also hash-based MAC, stream-cipher based MAC, and block-cipher based MAC.
  - Message Digest. The result of applying a hash function to a message.
  - **Modular arithmetic.** A form of arithmetic where integers are considered equal if they leave the same remainder when divided by the modulus.
  - **Modulus.** The integer used to divide out by in modular arithmetic.

- **Most-significant bit (msb)**. The highest-order bit in an address, registers, data element, or instruction encoding.
- **Most-significant byte** (**MSB**). The highest-order byte in an address, registers, data element, or instruction encoding.
- NIST. National Institute of Standards. U.S. Government Agency responsible for defining and certifying standards.
- **P** Padding. Extra bits concatenated with a key, password, or plaintext.
  - **Physical memory.** The actual memory that can be accessed through the system's memory bus.
  - **Pipelining**. A technique that breaks operations, such as instruction processing or bus transactions, into smaller distinct stages or tenures (respectively) so that a subsequent operation can begin before the previous one has completed.
  - **PKEU.** Public Key Execution Unit. A device or silicon block which accelerates the mathematical algorithms associated with public key exchange. Typically uses the *RSA* or *Diffie-Hellman* algorithms.
  - **PKI.** Public Key Infrastructure. PKIs are designed to solve the key management problem.
  - **Plaintext.** The data to be encrypted.
  - **Private key.** In public-key cryptography, this key is the secret key. It is primarily used for decryption but is also used for encryption with digital signatures.
  - **PRNG**. Pseudo Random Number Generator. A device or silicon block which produces numbers or bits which are related to preceding and following numbers or bits, however this relationship is nearly imperceptible. Only predictable in a theoretical sense.
  - **Public key.** In public-key cryptography this key is made public to all, it is primarily used for encryption but can be used for verifying signatures.
  - **Public-key cryptography.** Cryptography based on methods involving a public key and a private key.

R

- **RC4 algorithm.** Byte oriented, therefore a byte of plaintext is encrypted with a permuted substitution box (S-box) key to produce a byte of ciphertext. The key is variable length and supports in byte increments key lengths from 40 bits to 128 bits, providing a wide range of strengths.
- **RNG.** Random Number Generator. A device or silicon block which produces numbers or bits which are non-deterministically related to preceding and following numbers or bits, thoroughly unpredictable.
- **RSA algorithm.** A public-key cryptosystem based on the factoring problem. RSA stands for Rivest, Shamir and Adleman, the developers of the RSA public-key cryptosystem.

S

- **Secret key.** In secret-key cryptography, this is the key used both for encryption and decryption. Can be a symmetric (shared secret) key or an asymmetric private key.
- **Security Association (SA).** In IPSec, the context which governs a one-way session using encryption or authentication. A separate SA governs the one-way session by which the responder encrypts or authenticates messages.
- **Security Parameters Index (SPI).** In IPSec, a specific field in the packet header which identifies the Security Associations already established for the one-way session the packet belongs to.
- **Self-synchronous.** Refers to a stream cipher, when the keystream is dependent on the data and its encryption.
- **Session key.** A key for symmetric-key cryptosystems that is used for the duration of one message or communication session.
- **SHA-1.** Secure-Hash Algorithm. Hashing algorithm which pads the message to be hashed (if necessary) to create a 512 bit block. This block is compressed by XOR-ing two inputs: the 512-bit message block, and a 160-bit key. Stronger than MD-5.
- **Shared key.** The secret key two (or more) users share in a symmetric-key cryptosystem.
- **Slave**. The device addressed by a master device. The slave is identified in the address tenure and is responsible for supplying or latching the requested data for the master during the data tenure.

- **SSL** Security socket layer protocol. Invented by Netscape Communications, Inc. This protocol provides end-to-end encryption of application layer network traffic.
- **Stall**. An occurrence when an encryption operation cannot proceed to the next stage.
- **Stream cipher.** A secret-key encryption algorithm that operates on a bit at a time.
- **Stream cipher based MAC.** MAC that uses linear feedback shift registers (LFSRs) to reduce the size of the data it processes.
- **Strong encryption.** Conversion of plaintext to ciphertext which is highly resistant to attack by crypto-analysis. Accomplished through inherently one-way mathematical functions.
- **Symmetric cipher.** An encryption algorithm in which the same key is used for encryption as decryption.
- **Symmetric key.** A key that is used for both encryption and decryption. See secret key.
- **Synchronization.** A process to ensure that operations occur strictly *in order*.
- **Synchronous.** A property of a stream cipher, stating that the keystream is generated independently of the plaintext and ciphertext.
- **System memory.** The physical memory available to a processor.
- Throughput. The bits-per-second measure of the amount of data that is encrypted or hashed per clock cycle.
  - **TLS.** Transport Layer Security protocol. It is effectively SSL 3.1.
  - **Transaction**. A complete exchange between two bus devices. A transaction is typically comprised of an address tenure and one or more data tenures, which may overlap or occur separately from the address tenure. A transaction may be minimally comprised of an address tenure only.
  - **Triple DES**. See *3DES*.
- UPM. Universal Programmable Machine. Complex chip select device found on the PowerQUICC and PowerQUICC II.

XOR. A binary bitwise operator yielding the result one if the two values are different and zero otherwise. XOR is an abbreviation for exclusive-OR.

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**GLO** Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations