

# **AN2377 Application note**

Using the STM1403/1404 security supervisors to clear external SRAM

# Introduction

The STM1403/1404 is a family of low power intrusion (tamper) detection security supervisors for the Point of Sale (POS) terminal market. They enable manufacturers to meet security standards such as FIPS-140 (NIST, US Dept. of Commerce), EMV Co, ISO, ZKA (Germany) and Visa PED. Until recently, many of these intrusion detection functions were implemented by using several discrete devices. The STM1403/1404 integrates all these functions into a small profile security-friendly QFN package. The STM1403/1404 meets most price, performance and board space objectives while ensuring customers are able to meet current and future security certification requirements for physical and environmental tamper detection.

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# 1 Targeted applications

The STM1403/1404 family can be used in the High Security Module (HSM) of a Point of Sale system such as: POS terminals, PCs with cash drawers, standalone credit authorization / debit card terminals, electronic cash registers, vending machines, standalone check readers and signature capture devices.

# 1.1 High security module (HSM)

The STM1403/1404 may be incorporated into the HSM which also includes the cryptographic module with the crypto keys stored in secure SRAM. The STM1403/1404 devices integrate most, if not all, of the key functions necessary to continuously monitor physical tamper inputs, supply voltages (primary Vcc and secondary battery back-up) and ambient temperature (STM1404 only).

When an intrusion is detected, an alarm is issued by the STM1403/1404 device. Once the alarm is received by the system it can immediately initiate a process to "zeroize" the cryptographic keys in volatile SRAM to prevent the intruder from gaining access to them. The HSM is thus rendered non-functional, until shipped back to the factory for diagnostic tests and re-coding.

# 1.2 Security levels

There are different levels of security certification depending on the system application. As an example, the FEDERAL INFORMATION PROCESSING STANDARDS (FIPS-140) publication provides a standard used by Federal organizations when these organizations specify that cryptographic-based security systems are necessary to provide protection for sensitive data. There are many other country specific and industry specific standards that POS system vendors are required to meet.

The STM1403/1404 family has been defined to meet these standards for physical and environmental tamper detection.




Figure 1. Federal information processing standard 140

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## 1.3 STM1403 integrated functions

The STM1403 device is targeted at Security Level 3 and lower. It has the following functions integrated: STM704 battery switchover supervisor; Physical tamper detect/alarm functions; Over/under operating voltage alarm; Battery low voltage detect function; and an optional voltage reference (Vref) out of 1.237V.

# 1.4 STM1404 for security level 4

There is also the 100% pin-compatible STM1404, a functional superset of the STM1403, targeted at highest security level 4. In addition to the functionality of STM1403, it has several options of factory programmed over/under temperature alarms.



# 2 How it works

### 2.1 Physical tamper

The STM1403/1404 device provides four independent tamper input pins, TP<sub>1</sub> through TP<sub>4</sub>, that can be used to monitor four separate signals. These tamper input pins can be used to indicate that a tamper event has occurred by either the opening or closing of a switch, forcing the pin to its tampered state (a high level for pins TP<sub>2</sub> and TP<sub>4</sub>, or low level for TP<sub>1</sub> and TP<sub>3</sub>).

# 2.2 Over/under voltage detection

When the internal voltage (VINT; where  $V_{INT}$  can be  $V_{BAT}$  or  $V_{CC}$ ), either goes above the high voltage limit ( $V_{HV}$ ) or drops below the low voltage limit ( $V_{LV}$ ), an alarm is generated.

# 2.3 Over/under temperature detection (STM1404 only)

When the die temperature  $(T_A)$ , either goes above the high temperature limit  $(T_H)$  or drops below the low temperature limit  $(T_L)$ , an alarm is generated.

After any alarm condition occurs, the open drain Security Alarm Output (/SAL) will be forced low.

## 2.4 Clearing external memory

The STM1403/1404 can easily be configured to clear external, battery-backed SRAM. One way to clear or corrupt the external memory, is to force  $V_{CC}$  of the SRAM to Ground. This removes power from the volatile SRAM, allowing the memory array to return to its default state, effectively clearing the sensitive data contained in the memory array. The STM140xC is designed specifically for this purpose (See *Table 1.*). When any alarm condition occurs, forcing the /SAL pin low, the  $V_{OUT}$  pin which supplies power to the external SRAM, will also be forced low, driving the  $V_{CC}$  pin of the SRAM to Ground. *Figure 2.* shows the circuit connection. The voltage regulator should also be disabled to avoid powering the SRAM through the input protection of one of its address or control pins.

| Option   | V <sub>OUT</sub> Status during alarm | Affect on external SRAM           |
|----------|--------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| STM140xA | ON                                   | Remains powered-up                |
| STM140xB | High-Z                               | For use with negative charge pump |
| STM140xC | Ground                               | Basic approach to clear SRAM      |






Figure 2. Circuit connection to drive SRAM V<sub>CC</sub> to ground (STM140xC)

# 2.5 Clearing the external memory using a negative charge pump (STM140xB)

However, some SRAMs require a significant amount of time for the memory to be corrupted if  $V_{CC}$  is simply grounded. To corrupt the memory in a shorter period of time, the user can take  $V_{CC}$  of the SRAM to a negative voltage. By taking  $V_{CC}$  to a negative voltage, the input protection diode turns on forcing any internal capacitive nodes to be discharged, quickly corrupting the memory.

Therefore, in order to rapidly corrupt the external volatile SRAM, a negative charge pump device should be used with the STM140xB to drive  $V_{CC}$  of the SRAM to a negative voltage during the tamper condition. *Figure 3.* shows how to connect this circuit. When using the STM140xB with the charge pump device, the user must also provide a standard hex inverter and an N-channel MOSFET to isolate the  $V_{OUT}$  of the STM140xB from the output (OUT) of the charge pump during normal operation. During normal operation the active low / SAL signal will be high, disabling the charge pump. While disabled, the output of most charge pumps will be forced to Ground. In order to allow proper operation of the SRAM, the MOSFET must be "off" to isolate  $V_{CC}$  of the SRAM from the charge pump output.

During a tamper condition, the /SAL output will be forced low, causing the corresponding hex inverter outputs to go high. One signal will control the inhibit pin of the DC regulator, putting the regulator in standby mode, removing power from the circuit. A second signal will turn ON the N-channel MOSFET, connecting the output of the charge pump with the V<sub>CC</sub> pin of the SRAM. A third signal will enable the charge pump generating a negative voltage on the V<sub>CC</sub> pin of the SRAM, causing data corruption. Clearing the SRAM data is primarily a function of the SRAM used, and the magnitude and duration of the negative voltage applied. This should be characterized in the application by the user.

It is typically recommended that low ESR capacitors be used with the charge pump to reduce noise and ripple. A small capacitance value delivers less charge per clock cycle to the output, resulting in lower output ripple and also a reduction in the maximum  $I_{OUT}$ 

capability. Therefore, a ceramic capacitor is initially recommended with a value in the range of  $0.022\mu$ F or less.




Figure 3. Circuit connection when using negative charge pump (STM140xB)



# **3 Efficiency results**

Depending on the process technology used to manufacture of the external SRAM, clearing the memory may require varying durations of negative potential on the  $V_{CC}$  pin.

At STMicroelectronics, we have evaluated several different SRAMs with different densities and found that we were able to corrupt the memory with certain minimum duration (1 second) negative pulse widths (see *Table 2., Table 3.* and *Table 4.*).

| Vendor  | Vcc            | Temp  | Pulse width | Memory clear | Comments                   |
|---------|----------------|-------|-------------|--------------|----------------------------|
|         | Vss            |       | 1 sec       | Yes          | Corrupted with random data |
|         | -1V Undershoot | 85°C  | 1.6 msec    | No           | Partial corruption         |
|         | -1V Undershoot |       | 4msec       | Yes          | Corrupted with random data |
|         | Vss            |       | 8sec        | No           |                            |
|         | Vss            | 25°C  | 10sec       | Yes          | Corrupted with random data |
|         | -1V Undershoot |       | 10msec      | Yes          | Corrupted with random data |
|         | Vss            |       | 35sec       | No           |                            |
|         | Vss            | 0°C   | 55sec       | No           |                            |
|         | Vss            |       | 70sec       | Yes          | Corrupted with random data |
| Vendor1 | -1V Undershoot |       | 1.0 sec     | No           | Partial corruption         |
|         | -1V Undershoot |       | 1.3 sec     | No           | Partial corruption         |
|         | -1V Undershoot |       | 1.6 sec     | Yes          | Corrupted with random data |
|         | -2V Undershoot |       | 8 msec      | No           | Partial corruption         |
|         | -2V Undershoot |       | 40 msec     | Yes          | Corrupted with random data |
|         | -1V Undershoot |       | 8 sec       | No           |                            |
|         | -1V Undershoot | -40°C | 16sec       | No           |                            |
|         | -1V Undershoot |       | 20 sec      | Yes          | Corrupted with random data |
|         | -2V Undershoot |       | 40 sec      | No           | Partial corruption         |
|         | -2V Undershoot |       | 80 msec     | Yes          | Corrupted with random data |

 Table 2.
 1 Mb SRAM clear characterization results - Vendor1



| Vendor  | Vcc            | Temp  | Pulse width | Memory clear | Comments                   |
|---------|----------------|-------|-------------|--------------|----------------------------|
|         | -1V Undershoot | 85°C  | 8msec       | No           |                            |
|         | -1V Undershoot |       | 80msec      | Yes          | Corrupted with random data |
|         | -1V Undershoot | 25°C  | 10msec      | Yes          | Corrupted with random data |
|         | -1V Undershoot | 0°C   | 1.3 sec     | No           | Partial corruption         |
| Vendor2 | -1V Undershoot |       | 1.6 sec     | Yes          | Corrupted with random data |
| venuorz | -2V Undershoot |       | 8 msec      | No           | Partial corruption         |
|         | -2V Undershoot |       | 40 msec     | Yes          | Corrupted with random data |
|         | -2V Undershoot |       | 200 msec    | No           |                            |
|         | -2V Undershoot | -40°C | 800 msec    | No           |                            |
|         | -2V Undershoot |       | 1.6 sec     | Yes          | Corrupted with random data |

Table 3. 1 Mb SRAM clear characterization results - Vendor2

| Table 4. | 1 Mb SRAM clear characterization results - Vendor3 |
|----------|--|
|          |  |

| Vendor  | Vcc            | Temp  | Pulse width | Memory clear | Comments                   |
|---------|----------------|-------|-------------|--------------|----------------------------|
|         | -1V Undershoot | 85°C  | 4 msec      | Yes          | Corrupted with random data |
|         | -1V Undershoot |       | 16 msec     | No           |                            |
|         | -1V Undershoot | 25°C  | 40 msec     | No           |                            |
|         | -1V Undershoot |       | 80 msec     | No           |                            |
|         | -1V Undershoot |       | 160 msec    | Yes          | Corrupted with random data |
|         | -1V Undershoot | 0°C   | 800 msec    | No           | Partial corruption         |
|         | -1V Undershoot |       | 1.0 sec     | No           | Partial corruption         |
|         | -1V Undershoot |       | 2.0 sec     | Yes          | Corrupted with random data |
| Vendor3 | -2V Undershoot |       | 400 msec    | No           |                            |
|         | -2V Undershoot |       | 800 msec    | No           | Partial corruption         |
|         | -2V Undershoot |       | 1 sec       | Yes          | Corrupted with random data |
|         | -1V Undershoot |       | 4 sec       | No           |                            |
|         | -1V Undershoot | -40°C | 8 sec       | No           |                            |
|         | -1V Undershoot |       | 20 sec      | Yes          | Corrupted with random data |
|         | -2V Undershoot |       | 1.6 sec     | No           |                            |
|         | -2V Undershoot |       | 4 sec       | No           |                            |
|         | -2V Undershoot |       | 10 sec      | Yes          | Corrupted with random data |

Note:

The data above was taken to evaluate various SRAMs to determine the length of time required to clear the data by grounding or forcing a negative voltage on the Vcc supply pin. This data indicates that the time is a function of temperature, voltage and manufacturer (and may also vary by revision). This data was taken on a very limited sample size, and should not be considered conclusive. No data was taken to evaluate the long-term reliability impact on the SRAM as a result of the negative voltages.



# 4 Conclusion

With the increasing frequency of credit card fraud and identity theft in applications like ATM machines or POS terminals, ST is leading the way in protecting this sensitive data with its new line of security supervisors. When this sensitive data is stored in external volatile memory the STM1403/1404 solution can provide early detection when these devices have been tampered with and also clear the RAM before the intruder can access this data.



# 5 Revision history

#### Table 5. Revision history

| Date        | Revision | Changes          |
|-------------|----------|------------------|
| 29-Jun-2006 | 1        | Initial release. |



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